Who cares about Latvia, anyway?

Apparently the financial markets consider it a minnow in an ocean of liquidity. Stocks and bonds are all doing just fine today, thank you, while Latvia is having serious currency problems that threaten Sweden's banks, while the other Euro nations are strained themselves.

"Latvia's latest crisis unfolded as new data confirmed economic fragility across Europe, where nine countries -- including Germany and Italy -- drew warnings Wednesday from the European Commission for widening budget deficits."
(source: WSJ)

An analyst from Brown Brothers provides more detail of some of the austerity programs -- limiting liability of homeowners. Apparently no big deal to the West, since credit default swaps are down today.

It might very well be a perfect setup, as Jansen at Across the curve points out:

"Maybe all this means that we are setting up for a giant duration grab which will leave the curve far flatter than anyone though possible. Investors will delude themselves into thinking that there is no risk in a 10 year Treasury or a 30 year bond.

When everyone is in the pool someone will saunter by and throw a plugged in toaster into the deep end. It will surely end very ugly."
(Source: Across the curve)

To which someone created a fanciful depiction of the toaster in response. One can only wonder if the founders of Thinkorswim had this type of metaphor in mind when they got started. It certainly seems appropriate.

We believe the thinkers can use today's experience to gain a better understanding why it's prudent to discount the U.S. economy bashers, as it is clear that economic troubles in the U.S. are matched by the Eurozone troubles. There just isn't all that many places to flee to if you want to stay out of financial trouble.

So it's no wonder that even in the face of massive deficits in the U.S. all the way out to the visible horizon US Treasury prices hold their own. Even if it's true that the U.S. is a sinking boat, all the other boats have big holes in the hull, too. The U.S., being the biggest boat in the pool, will most likely be one of the last to soak it's passengers.

Where Is The Next Bubble?

Look out for the next round of "emerging markets".

In the late 90's the easy money policy coincided with the advent and new-found stability and strength of the Internet, pumping huge amounts of speculative money into dot-com ventures. In the early 00's, the easy money policy coincided with the advent of the new-found stability and strength of credit derivatives. Readers might recall Enron set the stage for a new way to look at derivatives, after which the same geniuses of mind that invented them for energy and bandwidth extrapolated the concept into credit markets like never before. The question for us today is what financial model has the same characteristics that make for speculative exploitation?

First, it must be global in nature -- accessible and understandable to every language, culture, and nation. The last two bubbles occurred everywhere. In fact, there isn't a single nation big enough to absorb all the money in the world by itself. We need a band-wagon big enough for the entire human race.

Second, it has to be relatively new, as in "iteration 3". It has to be a bit of a novelty for the commoner and limitless. Bubbles don't grow where there are walls or boundaries. The Internet iteration 1 was limited to academia nerds, with commoners intrigued by the mystery of the new concept. Iteration 2 of the Internet found some bold adventurists dabbling in newly invented business models that only a very few understood well enough to make sense of. By iteration 3, the commoners began to understand this new business from having been exposed to it as consumers in iteration 2. The Internet had no bounds. So when the easy money politics of Alan Greenspan kicked in, it was a no brainier for high-finance to use that cheap easy money to take extraordinary risk on new ventures into this emerging new opportunity called "The Internet".

In the case of credit markets, collateralized debt began with mortgage backed securities, invented and implemented first in the federal lending agencies created in the 1930s and later. In the 70s, securitization of those mortgages was invented. (source: "Introduction to Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS)"). For years they mostly sat their as a tool for the nerds of finance. With the advent and spread of computers, the agency bonds became a common investment playground of everyday finance. By the time Greenspan stepped in to rescue the markets from the dot-com bust with round two of ridiculously low interest rates, the collateralized debt instrument was so well established and proven it was now ready to exploit that cheap easy credit through the carry trade, in which even Japanese housewives were speculating.

Now that Ben Bernanke is fully entrenched with round three of subsidized and ridiculously low interest rates, where will that money go? It might very well be the Asian and South American emerging markets. In the '90s, a wave of free market economics swept the globe. The managed economy fell into disrepute. Small and large nations alike abandoned their commanding heights and implemented market reforms. In this iteration 1 of emerging markets, only the nerds of economics understood what was going on. No common investor in their right mind would gamble on such a large experiment in finance as to invest in a former dictatorship. By the time the collateralized debt machine was in place, these nations had established themselves as more than just a wild experiment. Their reforms actually appeared to be working. Business ventures in these nations seemed to be sticking. Policy official spoke the same language as industrial nations. Global trade and open markets were working. During the 2000's, the term "Emerging Market" and BRIC became reputable areas of interest for normal investment firms. Average investors were leery, but interested, and willing to dabble with 10% exposure to this "industry" as the bulk of their portfolio focused on Real Estate and domestic equities. Most importantly, they were learning the lingo of international investments and cursory knowledge of foreign economics.

Enter iteration 3 of emerging markets. The fuel for such an explosion could very well be the U.S. carry trade. If Bernanke can keep interest rates unnaturally low "for an extended period" like he has said, it just might fuel a new round of exploitation in those growing non-US markets, which would lock up huge amounts of US Dollar assets in foreign debt at absurdly low rates, and drive the price inflation we should have seen in the US into those other markets instead. The confirmation of this new bubble will be normal asset allocations in the high double digits in emerging markets by Western investors. The peak will come when taxi drivers and hair dressers share tips about the nations they are exploiting.

If Carry Trade Wave 2 is funded with dollars, we would not see significant price inflation in the US. Instead, price inflation will be "exported" to emerging markets as an ample supply of funds flows to them. Just as "credit risk" became a thing of the past in the last bubble, "foreign investment risk" would be a thing of the past in this bubble, as their GDPs explode in what would be sold as the new age of international trade. That would be the ultimate confirmation, when broker pitches include the assurance that foreign investment is nothing to fear as emerging nations support each other without the 'need' for the U.S. economy to sustain them.

Don't Ask, Don't Tell

Putting a new twist the common vernacular ...

Subtitle: "Why we need to keep our operations hush-hush secret", by Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, United States Federal Reserve Bank, in testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C, September 25, 2009.

If you don't believe me, you can read the full text of the prepared speech for yourself as we've linked to it above. Or you can just believe me when I say the basic message is, "Trust me, we do all this for your own good. These aren't the drones you're looking for. You can go about your business."

Don't ask why we're on a Star Wars kick this week. It just seems to be working out that way. May the force be with you.

Embrace Your Feelings

That’s the wisdom from “Old Ben” of Star Wars fame as he tried to take down the Evil Empire's death star. Looks like the nation of France is embracing The Force after all these years as they try to take down the Evil Empire's death star “players”.

I'm sure it's just a coincidence the author of "France to count happiness in GDP" at the Financial Times is Ben Hall.

The Economic Policy Journal blog has a free summary of the news.

Money Supply Blog

The Financial Times has a blog on Money Supply around the world. We haven't yet formed an opinion about it yet, but the graphic (logo?) is slightly innacurate in our estimation. That scafolding and framing holding up the nations should be a house of cards, not steel. Steel is SO-O-O 19th century!

Bond Fundamental Shift on the Horizon

Not sure if this horizon is near or far, but it will be an interesting experience when we get there.

Sources say the Fed is in secretive talks with bond
dealers to restart "reverse repurchase agreements" in an effort to siphon
some of the $1T-or-so it's pumped into the economy. Unused since last December, reverse repos take cash out of circulation when the Fed sells securities to its 18 primary dealers for a set duration.
(source: SeekingAlpha).

So if the Fed is delivering inventory into the system, and the Federal Government is issuing new inventory into the system, how exactly are interest rates supposed to stay low for an extended period if this horizon is not equally far away?

Why Everyone Is So Bullish on Gold

Cliff Wachtel at Seeking Alpha asked the question today, why are "speculators" buying so much gold while "professionals" are shorting?

It appears to us he fails to realize (or he's obfuscating his real understandings for some journalistic reason) the broader fundamental nature of where prices and value come from. By that we mean the fundamental nature as described by Ludwig von Mises' in Human Action.

In the fall of 2008, the Federal Reserve made it abundantly clear that they would stop at nothing to ensure they could control all financial markets and keep dollars flowing. Finally, after the success at keeping security markets open, they found themselves with functional markets but little or no demand for debt. As money piled up in accounts of all kinds, they then had to worry about the collapse of money velocity.

There is absolutely only one way to make money moving -- punish anyone who doesn't trade it (spend it) in exchange for non-money. Since they have no legislative power, the only tool is debasement and negative interest rates (charging savers for storing money instead of rewarding them with interest payments).

Debasement was easy -- in Dec '08 and Jan '09 they announced unprecedented (in the U.S.) money creation schemes in the purchase of agency debt and U.S. Treasurys. Negative interest rates seemed to manifest themselves by the nature of the credit crisis.

So we now find ourselves in an environment where holding cash carries a risk that has to be weighed against the risks of buying bonds, stocks, commodities, or anything else. Furthermore, add to the equation the necessity of businesses of all kinds to produce a ROI above single digits, and the natural inclination is to buy something that has potential for price appreciation or income. It's no surprise to us in this light, that equities and bonds are showing price strength in spite of so many macro-economic weaknesses and the fragility of all those green shoots.

Enjoy for now the fact that institutions are doing the buying of equities, bonds, and commodities. When the higher costs of the latter start squeezing business profits, they will either have to raise producer and consumer prices or suffer systemic business losses.

In the former case, PPI and CPI go up, which means the risk of "holding cash" now hits consumers with inflation -- they will start spending their cash before it's purchasing power disappears, empowering producers to raise prices (the ultimate feedback loop). In the case of the latter, shrinking profit margins will be bad for equities, which religiously motivates another round of policy changes to "stimulate" the economy, further devaluing (diluting) cash (i.e. dollars).

Very few choices today will provide price support for purchases in either scenario of inflation or economic stimulation (i.e. more currency debasement). One of them is precious metals and their centuries-old reliability as a store of value. It's not a coincidence that some sovereign nations are thinking of gold again as they did before the prevalence of fiat currencies and floating exchange rates. The only major institutions who seem to be bucking that trend are the biggest institutions in traditional western industrial regions who pin all their hopes on fiat currencies. They are the bankers and commercial traders Cliff refers to in his post.

Update Sept 22:
ColdCore now reports at SeekingAlpha some details about those other sovereign nations and their interest in acquiring the "real money" that the west shuns.

Corporate Bonds Priced to Perfection

Just posting this to record the event for future reference. This example of today's bond market pricing is a set up that makes us uncomfortable about bond prices. They've rallied so much that spreads don't allow much in the way of price appreciation on Corporates unless Treasury rates across the curve all come down.

It would be an unusual situation indeed for the U.S. economy to recover and have Treasury yields drop from where they are now. Some examples of price movement lately:

Colgate deal which priced several weeks ago at T+ 67. The deal was a six year maturity. That issue is now traded 14 basis points rich to the 7 year Treasury.
Walmart 5 year paper issued in May at T+ 125 basis points. That paper trades 40 basis points over the 5 year Treasury.
MSFT 5 year paper is freely available at T+ 25

Source: Across the Curve

------
Update 10/15/2009
J.D. Steinhilber, over at Seeking Alpha, provides some current bond information and more detail on the bond investor's dilemma.

Carry Trade, Funded by the U.S.

There's an interesting piece out of Across the Curve today from a USD/JPY analysis. If it's a fluke of nature and prices revert to the recent normal relationships, it will be easier to predict the outcome of US fiscal policy. If this is the start of a protracted trend, the global dynamics of money flow will be very different.

Namely, all this excess liquidity piling up from US and global quantitative easing would not produce the normal expected price inflation in the U.S. if dollars are borrowed by the Carry Trade crowd to fund their currency speculations outside of U. S. borders.

3mth USD LIBOR is now LOWER 3mth JPY LIBOR. This spread turned negative about three weeks ago, and in the same timeframe, Usd/Jpy has also fallen 2.9% (see chart attached).
Bottom line, the USD is soon becoming the new global funding currency...
(Source: Across the Curve)

We're not going to jump on a bandwagon touting that last sentence just yet, but if it comes to fruition it would sure change the dynamics of Bernanke's unwinding process. It might be the mechanism that gives the U.S. another stab at exporting the fiscal consequences of policies to the developing world. In other words, more of what has just happened in the last 10 years.

The S&P 500 According to the U.S. Treasury

Let's do a little common sense extrapolation. From the minutes of the August 4th Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee meeting, we have this little factoid about American corporate income taxes.

Director Ramanathan discussed the components of federal revenues in the current fiscal year versus last year, noting that corporate income taxes (which generally account for about 10% of total receipts) were lower by over 50% year to date...
(source: Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee)

Ok, so if tax revenues are down by 50% and there are no significant changes in tax rates, one can extrapolate that corporate profits are down 50% from a year ago.

A stock price is claim on long-term future cash flows from the company. Therefore, equity prices should be about half of what they were last year all things being equal.

But all things are not equal. Credit is different, money is different, business prospects are different, and perceptions of risks are different. Credit will not be as readily extended, the currencies across the globe are being diluted as fast as possible, businesses don't know when or where growth will come from, and everyone is on edge about credit defaults.

The SPY 52-week high is roughly 130 and today's trading is around 102. Valuations on stocks a year ago were at historic norms according to much of the research at Hussman Funds.

It sure seems to us that S&P 500 prices today are not at sustainable levels unless one presumes valuations last year were reasonable (i.e. the current year profits are a glitch on a much longer time frame) or currency debasement has been so deep current equity prices are normal when adjusted for real purchasing power. Neither of those seem to make sense, though, unless somehow the world is at a stage to repeat the growth of the 90s. How that might happen given the financial system's recent changes is a mystery.

The Bond Market Speaks

John Jansen's blog at Across the Curve gives us intraday bond market readings. One of today's posts on intraday spreads seems to us to indicate big money is preparing for economic weakness.

Today he points out, which has been repeated now for some time, that "TIPS spreads continue to narrow." Early this morning we found out overseas markets had no direction across the curve except in the 30-year bond. This might be anticipation of Federal Reserve interventions, except the long end of the curve has been particularly strong lately, which indicates subdued inflation expectations.

We think all this combined is telling us inflation is not presently feared, and that can only be based on a presumption that the economic environment is going to be soft.

If you you have a lot of long equity at this point, be careful. This same perspective came to us last weekend as we summarized last week's Barrons.

Meanwhile, over at Barrons, Michael Kahn provides technical analysis in "Fear Creeps Back into Bonds" suggesting bond market readings point to risk-aversion in the market place. The stock market is rallying on the new home sales report this morning as we write. Time will tell if equity markets are aware of this risk aversion or not.

What Does Soros Think?

Market Folly published a nice summary today of George Soros' hedge fund holdings.

This review by C. Kurdas on Soros' book The Alchemy of Finance will save you the trouble of reading the book. The book simply describes basic well known market psychology theory including a round-about way of describing the prevalence of existential belief in the minds of market participants. We like to summarize that with the catch-phrase, "You don't know Jack!"

If you want to be a successful, adaptable, 'reflexive' trader or investor, we recommend instead two books more directly addressing the issue of psychology listed below. As Mark Douglas pointed out in his book (the first one below) to a bond day trader whom he was advising, don't presume the other poor schmuck making a trade has better insights into the future than you. Stick to your strategy!

For adaptation to information as the market delivers it, we recommend reading John Hussman every week. Hussman is not a teacher, but his weekly commentaries to clients help you learn how professionals absorb data and apply it to reality, rather than trying to impose one's feeble world view onto the market.

Top Recommendations:
The Disciplined Trader: Developing Winning Attitudes
Trading for a Living: Psychology, Trading Tactics, Money Management

Take aways from Barrons, August 22nd, 2009

Stocks: Where's the demand-driven commerce? So far everything has been driven by government spending.

Look before you Leap

Gummy Bears

Banking and Finance: Commercial and Residential mortgages are worsening in some respects, in spite of all the green shoots. Some numbers and quotes from the Federal Reserve, and announcement that TALF will be extened.
Weekly Review

Technology: So where is the so-called PC Refresh cycle going to come from? Intel painted a rosy picture of the future, but three other tech companies have now joined the crowd of those who simply don't see any particular good news in the making.
View From the Top: No Rebound in Sight

Dividend Investing: Another piece on why reinvestment of dividends makes a good long term strategy. Read it if you haven't heard about that angle before. Skim for tickers if you have and like the idea. We think it makes sense to have some long term holdings in this phase of the business cycle in large cap companies with strong dividend histories. We'll leave it to the reader to judge whether Greek history provides any value to the theory.
Marathon Investing

Bonds: The best may be over for the bond market unless we get a sell off in corporates and munies and a rally in Treasuries for another buying opportunity. You can look for bond yields at your favorite quote provider, but there's also a good story on the municiple market. Suffice to say spreads between Treasury and corporates have narrowed in the last few months making it harder to find corporate bonds with a good chance of covering potential drop in purchasing power from quantitative easing. We might as well stick with the safety of Treasurys.
Seeking Yields on Munis That Aren't Puny

Speculative Plays:
Long MELA: "Taking Aim at Skin Cancer"
Short SHLD: "Washed Out"

Strategic Thinking:
Stocks are overpriced unless utopia breaks out real soon now. Commodity prices are priced right as long as China keeps buying what it doesn't presently need and India keeps it's capitalism in tact. Western economies are most likely going to see muted growth while Asia continues it's expansion of the middle-class demand for goods and services. The mindset "follow the money" suggests being invested directly in Asia and Brazil if not indirectly through domestic companies that get a high volume of revenues from them.

The off-the-cuff allocation at this point is long blue-chip dividend paying companies, short US indexes, and long commodity based companies or funds that pay dividends (or short their puts for dividends and purchases on pull-backs).

Caveat: While we are bullish on commodities in the one year time frame, we don't want to hide the fact that this week Barron's has a story that this might be a dangerous outlook. See "Base Metals on Borrowed Time"

Best of the Week
BRIC - forget Russia -- go where the commerce is. The interview with Christopher Wood contains some good insight into the macro-economics of the global economy, and why Brazil, India, and China have some specific characteristics about each of them that makes a focused investment in the right places a good idea. We highly recommend paying particular attention to his analysis of decoupling (in economics as well as the stock market) and what signs to look for that indicate decoupling of Asia equities.

What's our take on his expose?
Look for falling interest rates in Brazil. If FOREX fundamentals are right, Brazil bonds might be choice instruments there for income and long-term capital gains. One might also use the yields to buy something that is a domestic currency hedge in case your FOREX eats away at the gains.

India has the best of the equity markets of the three. See the interview for why that is. Our take then would be to look for small cap companies that supply goods and services to businesses.

In China, the strength is in state-owned companies, as they get the best of command economic privelidges. Thier financial services are especially inviting as corruption and greed that ruined Western finance is dealt with in China via execution. You may not share our opinion on the death penatly, but we think it provides a strong incentive for bank managers in China to be careful of thier actions.

When Premiums Make Sense

In the car industry there are rare events where certain cars sell at a premiums to MSRP when the product is rare and not likely to ever be available again.

While it's useful to know fact from fiction, especially in something that's easy to mathematically quantify, it's also good to know free market prices that are out of line with traditional pricing models don't necessarily indicate irrational behavior. Context is always the most important thing. While "bubble" is one of the most popular words in the investment community today, not everything you see that you don't value highly is a bubble. Context is everything.

When context lines up with analysis, you have strong forces at play. Such was the case in the dot.com bubble and the more recent real-estate bubble. On the other side of such crisis, when context no longer lines up with analysis, you have to put aside computer models and add human insight. In the case of PHK, the context is a rare bond market dynamic unavailable to retail investors. So it's not irrational for buyers to pay a premium to get a piece of something that won't be available shortly, specifically because it has very, very strong fundamental market forces behind the assets, and many of those assets are still priced to account for the end of the American economy within thier lifetime.

If $1.3 trillion of newly created money weren't chasing the bond market; if the Federal Reserve wasn't the primary market maker in commercial paper; if MBS and CDO bonds were trading in a free market; then PHK would probably be the worst product on earth. But this is not a free market. The dynamics of a deep pocket buyer chasing what no one else wants is unlikely to ever occur in my lifetime. Owning anything that has that kind of demand behind it can't be evaluated by traditional methods.

When the Delorean sold over MSRP, it wasn't foolish for those who paid the premium to get it while they could, because those who knew the auto market knew the prices would never be that cheap again, and the opportunity was limited. Now in hindsight we can see Delorean motors collapsed. So if you think the bond market and Federal Reserve buying program is going to collapse, you should not be participating in these bonds. But if you think the market is normalizing like it did in the other crisis, then a little investigation of fundamental forces is in order.

For months I would read John Mualdin describe the valuation of collateralized debt and the out of proportion pricing relative to real risk during the worst of the credit crisis. Every time I would salivate over the chance to buy those out-of-favor bonds as the irrational fear that the world as we know it was going to end tomorrow drove prices of even well-structured bonds into the ground. Not having a Bloomberg terminal or a bond trader's account, there was a fundamental opportunity of a lifetime that I had no way on earth to participate in. Then I discovered PIMCO was chasing that market for the same reason and in the same way I wanted, and had a vehicle available for me to jump on.

I paid a premium to get a piece of it because a) there was no other way for a common citizen to sell junk to the Federal Government at top dollar, and b) there were no option contracts I could buy to lock in the inevitable rise in price for this class of bonds, and c) Ben Bernanke's actions made it undeniably clear there was nothing on earth in the financial market that he wasn't willing to buy - nothing, not even the worst junk imaginable.

Like an option, there's no guarantee the market moves in your favor. One has to know the deeper fundamentals behind the cash flows and demands for the assets of the entity in question. You can't just look at the balance sheet values of the Real Estate assets of Sears Holdings Corporation (SHLD) and know what it's really worth. You have to know the actual location of that real estate and whether the real estate market itself will sustain, threaten, or increase that value. If the market for those R/E assets is drying up, SHLD may be overpriced. If they have a large government revitalization program behind them, SHLD may be under-priced. The issue boils down to whether the retail market has realized those values yet, or not. Price to book value may grow far more quickly than book value, primarily because book value is constrained while human intellect is not, even if abstractions and market forces not quantifiable by GAAP make it clear where future book values are most likely to move.

If we revisit this CEF when the credit crisis of 2008 is a distant memory, after bond spreads have normalized, and it still trades at a high premium, then I will join the short-seller's camp. Until then, Uncle Ben and Tim are ensuring the bonds I own through PHK have a strong, liquid, demand-driven market. I don't know any other product on earth that has an avid open buyer standing in the wings with an unlimited supply of blank checks to buy product.

When that buyer departs, things will change. But at this point their interest is strong and reliable.

The Business Cycle Continues

The last 12 months have seen unprecedented political, financial, and legal change in America and the world. Anyone who thinks they can make a 5-year expensive financial commitment today and go golfing is fooling themselves. Everything needs to be hedged and watched closely with a highly critical eye, with a strategy to get out and reverse course quickly.

The deleveraging angle so often touted as the required outcome from our recent past excesses is moot. There are two ways it can happen and the Fed has predictably chosen the unnatural path. The first way (the natural way) is credit contraction. Not just your favorite metric, but the entire scope across the globe. One thing the recent generation gets out of the new free-trade global economy is spreading of the costs of managed economies. No longer can one central bank destroy a nation through lousy policy as happened in the 90s. Now the consequences of lousy policies are dispersed globally.

The second way, the artificial way, is the course all industrial and developing nations are doing today: debasing the currency. This method works by keeping current-dollar credit values constant from artificial central-bank stimulated demand (see monetarism), but reducing the purchasing power of those dollars by dilution of the currency.

That's precisely why the U.S. economy is stabilizing, and that in turn stabilizes bonds across the spectrum. Oh yea, we will pay for it, but the piper isn't going to come calling in the next 12 months. He's lining up his resources to come charging in sometime in the next 3 or 4 years. The details of the intervention are different this time, but the pattern of replacing wealth destruction with new money (whether by fractional reserve credit expansion from absurdly low rates or direct injections of new reserves when rate intervention is insufficient) has been used over and over with the same outcome every time: economic boom followed by economic bust.

The boom is just starting. The really horrible bust that everyone is ranting about today won't hit us until about 3 or 4 years. You can see that pattern in any of your favorite long-term macro-economic charts.

Corporate Bond Rally May Stall Now

Today high-rated corporate bonds are trading just barely above government guaranteed bonds.

Yesterday we got a glimpse through Seeking Alpha just how far we've come in the last year.

At least at the top end of the rating scale, there's hardly room for any more contraction in spreads. The long term prospects for high-rated corporate bonds doesn't look good unless in fact Bernanke can actually overcome the forces of monetarism and keep real inflation at historical lows.

The best bet in bonds is the lower grade issues at this point. If high-grade rates remain low on a recovering economy from central bank purchase demands, those lower rated investment grade bonds will see continued contraction in spreads as default risk subsides. If high-grade rates rise while the economy recovers, lower rated investment grade bonds may not see declining yields, but contraction in spreads can still produce stable prices and above-inflation yields.

There are two primary risks, one of which is almost ignorable. The first is demise of the global economy, which is most unlikely but theoretically possible. For that scenario you better have backup food supplies, loads of currency (legal and barter) tucked under your mattress, and a plan for wilderness survival. The second is inflation rates rising to the point where low grade bonds fall in value with or without contracting yield spreads. This is much more likely than the former, and highly probably if Governments around the world don't back off their stimulus programs in rapid fashion.

The good news on the inflation story is monetarism reveals this kind of inflation takes 12 to 24 months to find it's way into consumer prices. At that point one will have to switch to inflation investing.

Until then, high yields, contracting spreads, and green shoots are the fundamentals one should be keeping their eyes on, and high yield investment grade bonds provide a tempting opportunity not often available with fundamental support like we have today.

How Ben Bernanke Saved the World

Subtitle: "How I Learned to Land a Helicopter", by Ben Bernanke

The title is past-tense for posterity's sake. This link needs to be remembered in the future when reality testifies on Ben's behalf. Fortunately for Ben we can never know what might have been -- we only know what he claims would have been if not for his policy, and must believe reality is better no matter how bad it is in fact, when the facts are in.

This, though, is his expose on how he plans to keep the world from hyperinflation after the biggest creation of fresh dollars the world has ever seen. Download a copy for posterity before the Wall Street Journal archivists cut off the link.

This isn't very reassuring: "we can raise the rate paid on reserve balances as we increase our target for the federal funds rate."

It's reassuring if all one cares about is ensuring that interest rates rise. We'd really like to know how the next upward move in fed funds isn't going to create a financial shock like all the others in this present generation. Granted, inflation is under control as measured by CPI and a few other choice tools, but 9+% unemployment is approaching historic levels, so this last fed funds move failed on the employment objectives. And apparently wiping out American investors' wealth is an acceptable outcome (as happened in the dot-com bust and now the real-estate bust) since it isn't a policy mandate to target preservation of American 401(k) accounts.

Furthermore, it doesn't address the bank's fiduciary duty to shareholders. How are banks going to justify tiny ROI when fed-funds level of yields are earned on an ever growing pile of reserves? This is going to pressure banks to use reserves for higher-yielding assets. To keep bank stockholders from rebelling, the rate on reserves is going to have to be higher than fed funds. This program will create a ceiling for fed funds, not a floor. Small banks without large in-house investment departments like Goldman and Morgan (recently converted to banks) are going to demand yields that match ROI garnered from their securities market operations. Equity investors will not stand for ROI in single digits. If banks can't make loans to business, they will seek out returns in other markets like securities.

As taxpayers, we're not very reassured. It is certain this board of governors won’t make the same mistakes as their predecessors, but equally certain the mistakes they do make will be costly. One can always offer the blind assurance that it would be worse with any other option. But of course you can’t prove what might have been. You can only have faith. When it comes to faith in the central bank policies, our only faith is that they will create a boom-bust cycle just like they have for generations. As for us, we’ll prepare for the inevitable disaster in what ever form it comes in the next business cycle bust, including the potential of having to pay 80% tax rates on inflation-induced capital gains for the "rich" (where rich is defined as anyone not a ward of government social programs) to pay for the next Keynesian stimulus devised for the consequential bust of present-day quantitative easing.

TALF Fails Its Objectives

That title might be misleading. It fails the stated objectives, but some might wonder if the real objective is to ensure a steady stream of large transactional revenue for primary dealers.

According to the federal reserve:

The Federal Reserve created the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), to help market participants meet the credit needs of households and small businesses by supporting the issuance of asset-backed securities...
Source: NY Fed

Notice on the July 16th facility, a full $0.6 billion in loans were requested. However, they weren't new loans. These were legacy securities. That means someone is putting up some old commercial real estate loans as collateral for cash, so they can do something better with them. It also reveals while they want to "support the issuance" of new securities, those working face to face with them aren't interested. There's too much junk in bonds they need to get rid of first.

One might argue, the proceeds from this loan might be used to fund new loans. While that's possible, its also possible they might be using the proceeds to fund payroll, pay bills, or who knows what.

But you see why the larger banks are in the money these days?

...Eligible borrowers must use a primary dealer...

The fee for the Fed alone is 20 basis points, or $1.3 million for this one operation on one day. No telling what kind of haircut the borrowers of the securities have to take with the primary dealers.

That also means one or more of the 17 dealers get piece of this action, even if they don't lend consumers a penny. One way to keep the banks solvent is to simply lend money back and forth between them; and you wonder if GDP is going to take off?

Maybe, maybe not. But one thing is for sure: those Goldman employees are going to be buying some pretty nice cars, clothes, jewelry, and other luxuries with their $386,395 annual salaries. Goldman is one of the primary dealers, and is no doubt making a boatload of money churning these legacy assets through all the facilities, not to mention the new bonds being issued by corporations, and the Federal Reserves direct purchase of securities.

As a matter of fact, Goldman is doing so well they confidently plan to issue around a billion dollars in unsecured bonds so they can leverage this new world of global liquidity. We don't yet what asset class is going to get that billion dollar stimulus injection, but something bubble somewhere is being pumped up.

Velocity of Money

We're going to have to do some serious research on the Velocity of Money. This topic keeps coming up, but there doesn't appear to be a good discussion of the fact that Velocity can't be measured; it can only be calculated.

Furthermore, the fact that it exists (though some think it doesn't) doesn't mean it is the cause of inflation. Most posts appear to interpret it that we.

We at SBC believe velocity is a consequence of the psychology driven by theories expounded on by monetarism and Austrian economics. Until we get the in-depth analysis, we'll have to suffice for a few comments on the web.

See today's note on Seeking Alpha.
And another on Across the Curve.
And what appears to be one of the first arguments discussing Velocity and Monetarism. Mauldin has good analysis, but we don't think it discredits the view of V as a symptom rather than cause. Rather, it simply explains why there is a 12 to 18 month delay between monetary expansion and price expansion.

If you have more background and commentary, please put them into the comments so we can consider them in our analysis.

Gold analysis at Seeking Alpha

Jake Towne has done an excellent job analyzing gold prices in Unlocking the Money Matrix: Gold Price Suppression. This deserves a careful review, especially by gold owners.

A first pass over this essay impressed us as the author uses many references to government and official documents. If we understand this correctly, the gold price is "managed" by central banks today, Paul Volker made a big mistake not to do likewise, and they won't make the same mistake this time until such time as their holdings preclude them from success. This premise is strengthened by a reference to a central bank research paper advocating just such a policy decades ago.

Someone pointed out months ago we don't have to worry about gold confiscation in the 21st century since it isn't the basis for money any more. This article suggests that even though that's true, the price of gold is the basis for psychology and fear in the populace, and that is something "they" certainly do need to control -- all nations, not just the U.S.

So it's interesting to consider how long they can succeed at controlling the price of gold, and what will they do when they no longer can?

There was also an interesting reference to replacing the many foreign currencies with just a few. This reminds us of the speech at the Council on Foreign Relations we pointed out last month advocating for fewer international currencies.

We don't believe in conspiracy theories (i.e. specific global planned and orchestrated events), but we do believe in a finite and very small universe of ideas. With billions of people and hundreds of thousands of leaders in government and business, it's not surprising for ideologies (like those at the CFR speeches) to hold sway over many powerful people who either intentionally or coincidentally align their actions to support the premises behind the conspiracies. Much like blogs and analysis hold sway over investor actions and move stocks, bonds, and currency prices in particular directions.

Mr. Towne has done an excellent job of research. What we now need is equally excellent peer review of the hard data. Please post your analysis as it comes in.