Luck Is The Residue of Good Design: Reserve Bank Transfers to the Treasury For 2013

"The Federal Reserve Board on Friday announced preliminary unaudited results indicating that the Reserve Banks provided for payments of approximately $77.7 billion of their estimated 2013 net income to the U.S. Treasury."
Src: Fed Press Release, January 10, 2014

One has to wonder how much of the national debt the federal reserve should buy up. Since operating costs are fixed, essentially if The Fed bought 100% of Treasury debt it would essentially be an interest free loan since the "surplus" of all that debt payment would just go back to the Treasury.

If that statement isn't intuitive, here's the math:

• Pretend "total cost of servicing the U.S. Treasury debt" was $453.3 billion.
• Pretend 100% of that debt servicing payments went to The Fed.
• Pretend The Fed needs "$20 billion for operations" (see the press release difference between what they recently earned and what they just returned)

If they owned all the debt, the cost of servicing the national debt would be 20 billion, not 453.3.

• 453.3 - 20 = 433.3
• "total cost of servicing the U.S. Treasury debt" minus "$20 billion for operations" = "surplus to return to the treasury"
• 453.3 - 433.3 = 20
• "total cost of servicing the U.S. Treasury debt" minus "surplus returned to the treasury" = "the net cost of servicing the national debt paid out from tax revenues"

Here's a common everyday scenario of how that works.

Son: Dad, this car must be worth a million bucks! It's a classic!
Dad: No son, no one will believe you unless you could get someone to pay you that much.
Son to his rich Uncle: Will you buy this for me for $1 million if I pay you a kickback? I need to recover my 10 grand I put into it.
Uncle: Sure, here's $1 million.
Son to Uncle: Thanks here's your receipt for $1 million.
Son to Dad: Look dad, I sold it for $1 million!
Dad: Wow, that's awesome. Sorry I doubted you.
Son to Uncle: Here's $999,990,000 back. I really only needed $10,000.

Test question: What was the 'true' cost of the car the uncle bought?

So the argument against fear that China will dump all our Treasuries is silly. In a crisis, The Fed simply agrees to buy it and store it for safekeeping until such time as a market buyer can be found to pay a reasonable price. That's exactly what they did in the bank run. When the world was about to come to an end (circa 2008) everyone (virtually, not literally) sucked up Treasury debt in a panic as the asset of last resort on earth. Naturally, most of those people calm down and eventually decide to go buy something better like stocks, bonds at rates above 2%, houses, etc., etc. Meanwhile, the Federal government started dumping new Treasuries on the market to cover the cost of all the unemployed.

Net Result: Massive flood of Treasuries coming to a market near you!

Reaction: The Fed simply agrees to buy it and store it for safekeeping until such time as a market buyer can be found to pay a reasonable price. We now know, also, that this safekeeping time frame is about 5-6 years. Like a storm water retention pool, they open the door and "collect" the "flood waters" in a safe storage facility until such time as they can trickle it out into the streams without washing away all the neighborhood homes and cars (pun intended).

One might argue, with a flood of new money to China (i.e. printing press operations to buy it all up) the value of the dollar would collapse.

Fantastic! Two great things to come out of that:

1. All the friggin' money Microsoft, Apple, Intel, and whomever that is locked up offshore because they don't want to pay tax on it would be going down the toilet unless they cash it in and bring it back home. The risk management dealers in their internal Treasuries would quickly do the math and realize paying tax is cheaper than loosing purchasing power. Not only that, making products offshore would price them out of the domestic market bringing those products back to America's friggin' huge economy. Bringing back the money instead would allow them to build factories to build domestically for less money.
2. The prices of American goods and services (and labor) would become "dirt cheap" just like China. So all the companies in all the nations on the planet would suddenly be looking for ways to hire Americans to produce their goods and services. And American businesses who are paying dirt-cheap labor in China and India would be paying through the nose because of their more expensive currencies. Those televisions, iPods, phones, clothes, etc., etc., would be cheaper to make here than there. American cars would be a fraction of the cost of foreign cars, and the auto industry is a HUGE part of our economy.

China knows this. China knows they can barely care for their billions of humans even in a weak global economy with America on the edge. China knows their political systems would collapse if their unemployment rates started climbing like America's from Americans shutting down manufacturing in China. China knows a population addicted to government stability would never support their totalitarian regime if they were starving. China doesn't have America over a barrel, America has them over a barrel. Or maybe the better analogy is the good-guy bad-guy movie scene where each is pointing a Glock 37 at the other's face. It's left as an exercise for the reader to assign good and bad labels on the player's in this scenario.

While we prefer sound money over fiat money, we have to say, the QE policy by the fed not only was a shrewd solution to a global run on the bank, it was a shrewd political statement to China (whether intentional or by unintended consequence) that the U.S. will do anything it takes to secure the value of U.S. Treasury debt.

Just another fantastic real-world example of the Navy SEAL's training motto:

“Luck is the residue of good design."

Dollar Liquidity Swaps Become Permanant

The Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank announced on Thursday that their existing temporary bilateral liquidity swap arrangements are being converted to standing arrangements, that is, arrangements that will remain in place until further notice.
src: FRB Press Release

One might think they've been doing this for a while and finally made it official. Not so, at least not between the U.S. and Switzerland. According to the SNB, they stopped making this available back in February 2010 for a time, and then started up again on May 11, 2010. The Bank of England had a similar note about May 11, 2010. We're not sure what was specially about that day, but it's now permanently special.

Maybe they are making lots of money on this deal, or maybe they simply need it so much they finally admit they can never stop swapping currencies. One wonders if all the QE money is sloshing around so much the big brokers keep the Central Banks scrambling to keep the currency availability high for some HFT regimen in international bonds.

The Central Bank of Japan provided and interesting set of amendments revealing (at least for Yen/Dollar swaps) the Federal Reserve will set the interest rates without qualifications (they struck the methodology for rates and now just hand it over the the New York Fed.

Here are the links for further reading.
SNB Guidelines
CBJ Amendments
BOE Guidelines

Risk, Risk, Everywhere

We try to avoid sending our readers to anything that smacks as an advertisement to sell newsletters, but sometimes the questions are relevant enough to justify addressing them head on, even if there is a sales pitch in there. Fortunately John Mauldin not only has a good pulse on the global investment community, but any sales pitch in his material is minimal compared to the content.

So with that, we point out some serious questions and concerns he addressed in a recent email which we happen to agree with. One might ask, how can you not agree with observations from the real world? Right, well, some do, so we just want to point that out.

From John's survey of readers, he concludes:

When everything is manipulated... you don't know the TRUE value of anything, right?

The Fed-driven fixed interest rates are breaking the backs of retirees (or near retirees), who find their nest eggs dwindling unless they take larger investment risks.

And the growing federal debt and the resulting "true" inflation is eating away at investors' capital.

They see interest rate risk, inflation risk, central bank and currency debasement risk, confiscatory tax rates... and bonds on life support, running out of air.

src: How to Find REAL in a World Full of FAKE

Stocks, Bonds, and Currencies doesn't agree with everything said or implied by John Mauldin or Grant Williams, but they have a long-standing reputation that justifies considering some of what they say. If you take a look at the video, come on back and tell us what you think.

Apparently the way to make money in publishing the news is to have a good database of past stories so you can paste the new name of the next story into your old copy. The folks over at MarketWatch appear to have taken the stories about the Greek debt crisis and replaced "Greece" with "Cyprus"

Seriously, don't these claims and fears sound familiar? To us it sounds like the same thing we read about when Iceland, Ireland, and Greece were set to destroy the E.U. and bring the global economy down with it.

"The problems may be worse than imagined, requiring changes to the bailout or making it unworkable."

"... the effect of capital controls ... will mean a prolonged recession which will make it impossible for [name_of_country] to meet its targets and repay its bailout debt..."

"the guarantee [plan_detail] is from the insolvent [name_of_country] government"

"...allocating losses to investors and bondholders may prove challenging in practice."

Source: 7 reasons Cyprus is more important than you think

Yup. Been there, done that. Time to go buy more high-yield bonds while the prices are cheap [again].

Why You Don't Want Government Controlling Social Security

First, they promise to take care of you and your future financial welfare:

The National Pensions Reserve Fund was established in April 2001 to meet as much as possible of the costs of Ireland's social welfare and public service pensions from 2025 onwards, when these costs are projected to increase dramatically due to the ageing of the population. The Fund is controlled and managed by the National Pensions Reserve Fund Commission. The Commission's functions include the determination and implementation of the Fund's investment strategy in accordance with its statutory investment policy. This policy requires that the Fund be invested so as to secure the optimal total financial return provided the level of risk is acceptable to the Commission.

(source: NPRF Home Page)

Then after they make a mess out of protecting your current financial welfare, they threaten your future welfare to compensate for their screw-ups.

In the first six months of 2011, the Government liquidated €10bn worth of National Pension Reserve Fund assets in order to contribute money to the EU/IMF bailout package.

Including this €10bn set aside for the support programme, the total fund size at the end of June was €20.8bn. This also comprises of the discretionary fund and directed portfolio, as well as bank investments of €5.5bn.

The discretionary fund has now been reduced in size to €5.3bn as a result of the liquidation of assets, according to the quarterly portfolio and performance update published today.

Including shares held in Bank of Ireland and AIB, the directed portfolio is worth €15.5bn.

(source: Business Leadership News)

If you're thinking, "That's ridiculous, that would never happen here" you must be twelve years old.

Let the Trade Wars Begin

Global anger swells at Fed actions

One can only wonder how this can end up good for the peons on every continent subject to the dictates of the global power mongers. If someone has some evidence to show how democracy benefits the commoner better than monarchies and dictatorships, we'd love to read it. Until then, we'll have to settle for finding ways to protect our ass-ets from the consequences of wars over national sovereignty.

Declining GDP Can Be Good

The following is an open letter to John Mauldin in response to Thoughts from the Frontline Weekly Newsletter, Six Impossible Things. It ties in with another story at telegraph.co.uk about the rapid decline in money supply.

--------------------------------------

Good essay, as usual, Mr. Mauldin. Hey, ask a trusted scientist about dimensional analysis. Your delta force equation is slightly incorrect; it should be multiplicative, not additive. Conceptually it's right, but the formula is formed wrong and the implications may be very different when you use the correct dimensions and mathematical operations. You might characterize this with the label "Busy Boys ... Better Boys", from the 3-cent stamp I discuss at the end, where I reveal another time in American history that produced sustainable healthy economic output. In short, declining GDP might not be bad if we think about it a little deeper than our illustrious leaders who seem to be acting out of habit, not knowledge.

First Fixing the Formula
For your delta force equation the definition of productivity has to be "dollars per person", since "population" is clearly "sum of persons". Therefore, the plus sign is wrong; it must be "multiplied by". Think about it this way in dimensional analysis: if you get 10 miles per gallon and have 20 gallons of gas, how many miles can you travel? The formula is "M traveled = 20G x 10 MPG". Take away the numbers and just use dimensions: M = G x MPG.

The "per" in math means"divided by", and so the Gs cancel each other out:
G x (M / G) [in our case, 20G x 10M / G)]

Canceling out the Gs...
20 x 10M = 200M

You can't do that with addition: 20G + 10MPG = M is an invalid formula.

So look again at your delta formula. What you're saying is correct, but addition is the wrong operation and the implications are different when you properly put them into the correct mathematical dimension.

In dimensions, your delta force would be "Dollars" = "People" x "dollars per person" [D = P x D/P]. But there is still something missing. Some dollars per person are zero. My 5 year old productivity is zero because he isn't working. Likewise for the unemployed. Those have to be clarified as "working people" x "average dollar per working person".

Implications
It is not enough to "grow one's population", one must grow the population of people "that contribute to monetary productive efforts". If population grows, but the output of the new people are smaller than existing labor, it may not produce a rising GDP. To the extent new population produces less per person than existing population, GDP may decline if workers leaving the work force were more productive.

The corporation I work for is making this mistake. In the latest economic downturn, they got rid of highly-skilled labor because their wages and benefits were high, resting on imported immigrants with lower wages. The consequence now is that what they produce requires much higher labor input, because the inexperienced immigrants repeat many of the old mistakes the experienced laborers learned how to avoid. I'm not against immigrant labor, I'm just pointing out that low-wage immigrant labor may do more harm than good, even though low wage costs can increase productivity metrics. Wage-based productivity metrics can't tell you how much output was sacrificed.

There is a component of output, momentum, that doesn't manifest itself instantly with the replacement of high wages with low wages. Decay exists in everything. Poorly maintained plant and equipment break down more often. Poorly engineered products don't last as long. Poor quality of service and product diminishes customer willingness to return for more or refer others when needs arise.

If our economic stimulus programs don't produce another artificial credit-induced wave of consumer spending to make up for the diminishing sales of the old customers, the diminished momentum from displaced experienced labor is going to become evident when the consequences of the inexperienced low wage worker is reflected in declining output, increasing costs, or declining sales.

Busy Boys ... Better Boys
I think this single-minded focus on dollar metrics by economists, business managers, and policy planners is insufficient for solving the real problems facing the global economy. I have a 3-cent US postage stamp I found in my Mom's estate. It has no date on it, but others appear to be from the 1950s. This little 3-cent stamp speaks volumes about the decline in American culture, and it's impact on GDP when we consider the abstractions evident in the Delta Force equation.

It's a picture of newspaper boy on the left walking through a neighborhood. A bag rests over his shoulder with the motto, "Busy Boys ... Better Boys". On the right is a hand holding a torch with the motto, "Free Enterprise". Between them is a statement, "In recognition of the important service rendered their communities and their nation by America's newspaper boys."

We used to call that "work ethic"; it used to be a virtue. I don't recall seeing any government program honoring and extolling the virtues of work ethic like that 1950s postage stamp. Instead the focus is on entitlement, equality, and rights. It's evident, too, when you shop for products and services. Finding anyone with a work ethic that values one's contribution to others is rare, especially in the young. The predominant theme is one's right to income, or making a sale (getting one's money) at the cost of integrity and future product loyalty.

It isn't enough to just get more people earning wages, or keeping wages high to prop up tax revenues. The culture needs to re-discover the value of contributing to the success of others, which is the essence of the old work ethic. The idea that one's existence earns them a fair wage without consideration of their contribution is the essence of the decline in American industry and economic health.

Bad Can Be Good
Declining GDP or contraction of money supply are not problems in and of themselves. They are symptoms of something more fundamental. Whether they are good or bad depends on the essence of the underlying fundamental. A family that lives within it's means is a financially healthy family. If that family had a growing GDP (lots of economic activity based on new debt) they would be creating new money (increasing money supply) as they take on new debt and buy more products and services.

If they change their wayward ways, stop incurring new debt, reduce spending to conform to current income, they will flatten their contribution to GDP and contribute to a reduction in money supply. This is good for the family and the community, because there comes a point when economic activity shifts from debt service payment to new product and service output, but at sustainable levels. This was what characterized the decades following the great depression, an age where people understood the good things of life come from hard work, not easy credit.

If the old GDP reflected this old over-spending habit of the community at large (an addiction to "more stuff" now!), a declining GDP may be indicative of a more sustainable and healthy future. Furthermore, to the extent business learns to evaluate their output based on making product more desirable to the consumer, not only on price, it means a higher satisfaction (standard of living) and a more sustainable business model for business.

PIIGS - Propped Up By Hope

Maybe Governor Daniel K. Tarullo's testimony to Congress helped the stock market sell off yesterday. There's nothing better than a federal official making an official proclamation that "Europe is still in trouble, and it can mess up the U.S.,too. We don't expect another U.S. bank crisis, but ya never know!" That, of course, was a paraphrase. Actually, the direct quote was

...holding out hope that further financial disruptions can be averted

There ya go, Europe is propped up by hope!

Too bad the fed can't just get involved in more swap markets. Their excess profits are returned back to the US Treasury, and the last crisis not only earned $5.8 billion in interest on forex swaps alone, but cut the cost of federal funding from the flight to dollars.

It's good business being a central bank.

Over the life of the previous temporary swap program (from December 2007 to February 2010), all swaps were repaid in full, and the Federal Reserve earned $5.8 billion in interest. Finally, the Federal Reserve bears no market pricing risk in these drawings.

Metals and Mining

Today we discovered Wildebeests, a web site devoted (in their own words) to the four M's: Minerals, Metals, the 'Merican economy, and Mathematica. They have some very good research and writing skills on the subject matter dear to our hearts, hard assets, and as such have earned a place in our investor links.

For some dialog between us, see the topic "Investing in Copper — What You Need to Know"

How Can Stock Market Asset Prices Fall?

For the stock market to drop in value, something else has to be in greater demand. In the realm of paper assets, the only competition for equity is debt or debt-money, and the non-paper competition is commodities and real-estate. Let's look at each one, except real-estate, which should be clear without saying in the spring of 2010 is a non-starter.

It's been clear for about three years now that money does not flee to hard assets when paper assets are in jeopardy. Those hard assets experience a sell off, too, as money flees in a crisis for the stability of U.S. dollars. This should be expected for some of the reasons we pointed out in November. So if the stock market has a significant sell off, don’t expect a commodity price spike. Whether one thinks it should or shouldn't is irrelevant. That fact is it hasn't done so for the last three years. If you think it should, then take the sell-off as a chance to take a position at steep discounts. We address the fallacy of the counter-argument for deflation at the end.

We are then left with the realm of paper-assets: debt-money (currency) or debt instruments. Debt instruments can get very complicated because there are many types with a variety of risk and valuation models. However, we can simplify that into a few commonalities: short term and long term, corporate and government. There is another debt instrument that doesn't quite fit that simplification: debt derivatives. Of the collateralized debt types, they essential represent the same fundamentals as bonds, except risks are slightly lower as default risk is diversified among autonomous entities. The other common derivatives can be grouped as options, futures, or credit default swaps. Virtually all of those by definition are relativity short-term bets.

If one is worried about equity valuations (the theme of this writing) corporate bonds would be of interest to some as bonds receive the first-fruits of cash flows and stand ahead of stock in bankruptcy (government usurpation notwithstanding). But if equity prices are at risk, corporate default risks rise, too, so prudent investors won't flee to corporate bonds in a crisis. We find ourselves left with short and long government debt, or debt derivatives, competing with equity for capital investment.

Let's take debt derivatives now, particularly the CDS type. The only intelligent reason to sell equity for CDS is a credit crisis. This is in fact exactly what we saw in February. As the credit crisis that precipitated the change subsides, money flows back out of short term CDS instruments and back into longer term assets. While we don't have access to CDS price charts, we can certainly see the equity markets didn't stay low for long, which is consistent in fact and in theory with crisis of the past. So CDS competition is necessarily sudden or short lived, especially as CDS contracts are temporal by nature.

The next type of debt instruments we look at are short term parking places: short-term government bonds, and short-term derivatives other than CDS. All are havens for capital in times of uncertainly. All are temporary parking places where one then reallocates into something of greater risk with more reward potential as the precipitating event subsides. The certainty of that movement is assured by monetary low-interest rate policies of central banks. No serious money manager can sit on ROI assets below 2% for long unless in fact the world experiences price deflation of all asset classes across the board. The Austrian theory of inflation arising as a consequence of money creation suggests in this season of 2010 that is an absurd expectation. The arguments to the contrary are addressed below.

Like real-estate, it should go without saying that holding long term government bonds in an era of Keynesian expansion with extremely low interest rates as one of the most high risk (to asset price) low-yield investments of capital. Just as rolling short term bond holdings into short term bond holdings for an extended period is only sensible in an era of broad-based systemic price deflation, holding fixed rate long bonds when currencies are threatened by increasing debt, and interest rates have no where to go but up, is asking for capital loss.

Finally, the last paper asset vying for attention of investor and speculator capital is currency. In a crisis, even after all the liquidity measures and deficit spending in the U.S., the U.S. dollar is still the target of those fleeing for safety. Again, we aren't concerned about whether that is a long term good bet, but simply recognize it as the status quo. If indeed one believes such moves are unwise in the long run, take it as an opportunity to buy more reliable dollar based assets at a discount if it should transpire. But keep in mind, when this flight to safety takes place, money that isn't secured in currency derivatives will be parked in government bonds of the currency of choice, and we’ve demonstrated those arguments only have temporary extremely short value propositions. So the fundamentals of holding "cash" (pseudonym for currency), is really just another name for a bond position, and hence currency moves will follow the fundamentals of bond investments. Since bonds of all substantive nations are basically in the same boat, we don’t expect significant changes in currency price ratios as much as we’ll see in equity positions, and of course foreigners’ demands for equities ultimately translates into foreigners’ bias for currency price ratios. We covered that topic to some degree in our September piece titled "Where is the Next Bubble?"

Given the choices money managers have in allocating capital, there appears to be only one reason to expect any kind of significant decline in equity prices in the near term, and that's a flight to safety. Just as the financial crisis of the past faded into history, there's every reason to believe this one will play out the same. We pointed out some of those reasons in November under the title "Contagion: Been There, Done That"

In that piece we also point out how the latter sub-crisis had less effect than the instigating crisis. We've seen this take place recently with Greece's crisis, where there was some quick and noticeable reaction to flee to dollars and push down equities and commodities, but it was short lived and of little significance. Many have tried to build the case that "this time it's different" and pull some data out of a hat that appears different. Typically what we find is that they simply were unaware of similar data that did appear last time, or they miss the similarity of essence and difference only in nomenclature of the old and new data.

So we are left with the only variable that could explain a protracted equity bear market - positive or negative inflation. Positive inflation usually gets improperly discounted by the established world view in one of two ways -- they pick a measure of money that hasn't grown well and then conclude we'll see tame inflation or deflation, or they pick a secondary influencing factor (velocity is popular these days) and argue that it will overcome the creation of money. We've provided some links on the velocity argument back in July '09 and revealed how money supply and velocity can take some interesting forms. It is our belief that the contradictions between the Austrian school theory that inflation is a monetary phenomena, and the new school that it is a velocity issue, is simply missing the point that the Austrian school theory carries with it an inferred premise that the time between the money hitting the street and the prices showing up at retail are delayed by several months to a few years. In order for monetary inflation to not eventually show up in price inflation (either consumer or capital asset price increases), one has to permanently and systemically keep the velocity low. For nations whose people have consumer goods in abundance, inflation most likely appears in financial asset prices. For nations whose people have a higher portion of earnings going toward basic goods and services, inflation most likely appears in consumer goods.

One could achieve low monetary velocity with an economic collapse, but no substantial and influential market participant in the global economy is working toward that goal. Every policy choice and operation is designed to get people to dump their cash for something that will provide a return. All policies are designed (intentionally or accidentally) to make holding cash a losing proposition. It's the essence of both kinds of capitalism; traditional theoretical capitalism and corrupted modern capitalism. The former objective is to use one's financial capital to produce value in goods and services to reap a return on investment. The latter objective is to use one's financial capital to make other people's money work for you. The latter is the fundamental basis of the debt-money system used by every nation on earth: leverage. With every segment of every population save a few fringe radical thinkers working toward the same objective (i.e. maximum return on investment) something global and earth shaking will have to occur to put everyone off their agenda. We aren't suggesting that can't happen, just that the most likely expectation is that it won't happen until this next round of business cycle expansion pops sometime in the teens of the 21st century.

For the stock market to drop in value, something else has to be in greater demand. At this juncture in 2010 it goes without saying that real-estate and long bonds are non-starters. Other hard assets have proven themselves unattractive as replacements (albeit good co-equals) for equities. Being left with nothing other than short-term non-performing parking places and short term quick gains made attractive by temporary sudden shocks, there simply isn’t any real long-term asset class competition to distract the global investment community from demanding more equity positions. The prudent scholar, historian, and investor should be prepared for another cyclical equity bull market in the coming few years.

Insider's view of the business cycle

What does the business cycle look like after a bust when you're the one on the inside looking out at the investment horizon? According to Bloomberg, it looks like half a trillion dollars.

"Buyout funds sitting on half a trillion dollars committed by investors may need more than a decade to put the money to work if mergers and acquisitions continue at the current pace."
(source: Bloomberg)

As readers should be well aware, nothing stays the same. The rate of M&A spending of the last year or so won't be the rate of spending in the future. As the business recovery solidifies the evidence of a "good buy" will change for the better and this money will start flowing. But notice this key point from the same article:

"“Investors only give the fund a particular investment period, typically three to six years, to invest the capital,” said Michael Harrell, co-chair of Debevoise & Plimpton LLC’s private-equity funds group in New York. “If you don’t use it, you lose it.”"

So there are two strong human factors at play there. First, those entrusted with the money don't want their clients to take it back. They will find a way to put that to work, and they have only two or three years to do so. What a coincidence this lull in M&A just happens to coincide with the first signs of recovery. (NOT!)

Second, if they don't put that capital to work, the clients who take the money back are going to have a lot of pent up demand as they seek out someone who will put the money to work for them.

No matter how you slice it, the business cycle is alive and well with capital left over from the recession looking for something to buy. 'Buy' is the operative word there. The only unanswered question is what will be in demand, and you can be sure it won't be cash and cash equivalents. After all, we're not talking about a world of Warren Buffett money managers. These are sharks looking for a kill.

But lest one gets too excited, temper the emotions with an interesting chart from the Bespoke Group. Looking at that 2009 March low, which was the bottom of that bust of the last business cycle, one should expect the 68% number will stick. Not only is the potential from here much less than the potential from 'there', but we still have a wave of news about to arrive regarding the mortgage reset wave of 2010.

We don't personally expect the news to crash the market or the economy, and don't expect a double-dip recession, but we do expect a wobbly stock market too jittery to make a firm run in either direction, albeit with a bias trend upward as happens with any business cycle boom phase.

As an aside, the astute reader should be careful to differentiate a boom from a bubble. Bubble talk won't be appropriate until about two or three years from now.

Credit Spreads Expected to Narrow

This Time Is Not Different

The business cycle is alive and well. If you read the blogs and mainstream media you'll see a lot of bearish sentiment about the destruction of the American economy. Certain things won't be exactly like they were, but the interesting thing we see often is those bearish pessimists keep trying to discredit the optimists by pointing out the fallacy of "this time it's different", meaning this bubble isn't going to thrive any more than the last one.

Well, they're right on one count. The bubble won't thrive better than the last. But the one guilty of clinging to a fallacy are the bears. The "this time it's different" fallacy really points back at them. See, the bears are trying to sell us on the idea that "this time" the business cycle isn't going to happen. No sir, this time we've really shot ourselves and the stock market is just going to go right back down until the entire economic system of the world resets.

Well, maybe we exaggerate their point of view a little, but the essence is there. We contend the business cycle is alive and well and the prudent person will plan accordingly.

So how then do we interpret the budget deficits in light of the business cycle? For background on the business cycle of boom and bust one should go dig around at some of our favorite economic sites:

The Mises Institute
The Foundation for Economic Education
Cafe Hayek

Budget Deficits For Fun and Profit

Budget deficits necessitate a rise in interest rates. To attract money to Treasuries, the price has to fall since people will be competing for better returns in riskier assets. A lower price for Treasuries will attract that money to that instrument along some continuum of risk/reward which differs from one person to another. Meanwhile, the supply of Treasuries is going to be growing. To attract buyers then, the market has to push down the price of Treasuries.

On the off chance (slim as it is) that the government can’t attract buyers from the open market, the central bank will have to monetize the debt to prevent failed auctions. Hence, gold would be a good buy against U.S. dollar dilution by the central bank. This is not only true because of the recent past liquidity measures, but even more so for potential future liquidity efforts, if they arise.

Nevertheless, even if there are no more waves of quantitative easing, the last stimulus will be enough to create a wave of price inflation in the next five years. The recent sell-off in gold was simply profit taking and flight to cash on fears of Euro defaults, accentuated by program trading on the momentum and short term hysteria. Now that has subsided, we can get a wave of movement back toward long-term fundamental expectations based on centuries-old historical expectations of the boom-bust business cycle.

The beauty of this setup is that it implies higher risk in Treasuries than historical norms. Higher risk between Treasuries and corporate bonds means the spread between Treasury and corporate will narrow to the extent that businesses still know how to run a sound business. This translates to basic business-cycle fundamentals acting in opposite directions on the two sides of the spread.

Even though Keynes may not have had the big picture well understood when it comes to long term health of the economy, he was not wrong that government deficit spending stimulates demand for goods and services in the marketplace. Demand for goods and services in the marketplace is good for “business”, which translates into improving business credit default risk as cash flows improve for them.

Given then improving business credit default risks with degrading government credit default risk, we have a nice scenario that translates into narrowing credit spreads between so called "risk free" Treasuries and business risk corporates.

We're not trying to sell the value of the business cycle, or suggest it's a good thing. We simply want to point out it is alive and well. The fundamental factors that create it in the first place aren't gone. Names change and leaders switch places, but the same system that brought us all the other booms and bubbles is going to give you another one. We happen to think the global Q/E policies of every modern nation on the planet is going to make this next one a doozie. The good news is you have plenty of time to prepare for the pop and chaos that ensues from the bust.

For a more entertaining perspective, check out the viral video "Fear the Boom and Bust".

Can demand for credit derivatives really lead to economic decline?

If we read the attempted implications of "Bond Market Vigilantes Sink Stocks" right, Mr. Mirhaydari claims the surge in the CDS market is threatening to raise interest rates on sovereign debt, which will force governments to cut spending and raise taxes to counter the cost of debt, which leads to a double dip recession, which leads to a falling stock market.

It makes perfect sense except for the part about politicians giving any hoot at all about the cost of their debt. Europe certainly has rules about limited deficit spending, but does anyone else that matters to global growth have such constraints?

Still, if the rush for CDS instruments is really the impetus behind recent market movements, that money flow will eventually unwind as the speculators take their profits and look for another ride to get excited about. Maybe the only real connection that makes sense is that institutions that have the clout to speculate with CDS, bonds, equities, and commodities all over the world have found a nice little emotional roller coaster to take out for a spin, after which they’ll whipsaw the markets and ride something else up to hysterical levels when they are ready to take profit out of the CDS markets.

If Mirhaydari is correct we'll see people talking about S&P 500 at 600 within a few months. If our secondary supposition is correct, we should see a strong rebound in stocks and commodities before summer. According to Jim Jubak's analysis of leading and lagging indicators, the latter appears more plausible.

Contagion: Been There, Done That

If you haven't seen Commanding Heights, we highly recommend it. It goes best with a strong thinking cap so you can read between the lines and find the subtle nuances of cause and effect in global finance.

I part three in particular, they covered the Asian Financial Crisis that started from a small little economy, that through currency controls created the exact same financial situation we had last year (don't miss the entire city built from the ground up on debt financing to which no one ever moved in to populate!), and as the piper came calling and financiers decided they were no longer going to sing that tune, it spread to all the healthy nations in the region as electronic funds transfers sucked all the money out of the region, one nation after another.

The funny thing is, that time the money needed a place to park, so it fled to another emerging nation -- Russia. They didn't go into details on the underlying reasons for Russia's default on debt, but ultimately it lead to Long Term Capital's implosion.

And then Brazil was hard on its heals with another collapse in this game of financial dominoes, but was averted by a quick influx of bail out money as the signs of stress were about to crack.

In every case: bail out after bail out after bail out.

The difference in 2008 was apparently "they" (those with all the money under control) learned how not to make the same mistake. When credit stopped in 2008, the money this time went straight to U.S. Dollars. No messing around this time with some new emerging entity that offered hope and promise of the perfect utopia. Instead, get out, park the money in the one nation and one security most likely to not have a political revolution over the hub-bub, and wait it out.

So in spite of all the uproar over Federal Reserve emergency lending and government bail out of banks in 2008, it really was not unprecedented. It was exactly what was done the last time. The only difference being this time it was an internal massive bailout instead of foreign nation massive bailouts. We contend the labels on the entities in question are irrelevant. It's the same thing every time (remember the third-world financial bail outs in the 80s?) Apparently it's a necessary evil every decade.

There is nothing new under the sun. Watch it, learn to read the signs, and get ready for a repeat since the fundamental foundations, the global monetary systems, haven't changed one bit. The hard part is learning how to discount and ignore the incessant monthly claims that "it's going to happen again!! Sell now and protect yourself!!!"

Meanwhile, like last time, it appears the contagion has stopped spreading. See our other post today, The Financial Crisis of 2008 is Officially Over.

We left out one interesting link on those references though. Just as Brazil's contagion was contained by preemptive quick response, The Fed has preempted the Commercial Real Estate issues that are falling on the heals of this most recent global financial crisis. Like Brazil's non-issue of the 90s, we predict the present CRE "crisis" will also become a little known financial issue of 2010.

In a nutshell, banks can restructure the loans and won't be "criticized" for what otherwise would have been bad lending practices. It's now OK to carry bad debt on the books.

Just like Japan? Well, not exactly. Turns out we can learn another important fact from Commanding Heights. In the 90s, when Japan's banks were stuck with all those bad loans, one bold man stood up and suggested if they want to get out of the crisis they need to loosen up the over-bearing burdensome regulatory structure that was constraining the banks. He was quickly fired from his cabinet post, they refused to "fix" the systemic problem, and the lost decade ensued.

If Benny and Timmy had nationalized the banks in the U.S. to "solve" our crisis and put massive layers of regulation on them (as if you can implement "Soviet Union Economics" and create vital capital formation) then we would have been destined for a lost decade in the U.S. as well. Instead, we have a much better chance of getting back to normal, which is setting ourselves up for another crisis in the teens of the 21st century just like the previous three decades.

The Financial Crisis of 2008 is Officially Over

On Friday of last week:

The Federal Reserve Board announced Friday that a temporary exemption to the limitations in section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, instituted as part of the response to the financial crisis, will expire as scheduled on October 30, 2009
(source: 2009 Banking and Consumer Regulatory Policy)

Then today:

9 of the 10 Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) that were determined in the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) earlier this year to need to raise capital or improve the quality of their capital to withstand a worse-than-expected economic scenario now have increased their capital sufficiently to meet or exceed their required capital buffers. The one exception, GMAC, is expected to meet its remaining buffer need by accessing the TARP Automotive Industry Financing Program, and is in discussions with the U.S. Treasury on the structure of its investment
(source: 2009 Banking and Consumer Regulatory Policy)

Update 11/18/2009

In light of the continued improvement in financial market conditions, the Federal Reserve Board on Tuesday announced that it approved a reduction in the maximum maturity of primary credit loans...
Prior to August 2007, the maximum available term of primary credit was generally overnight. The Federal Reserve lengthened the maximum maturity first to 30 days on August 17, 2007 and then to 90 days on March 16, 2008...
(source: Federal Reserve Press Release)

Who cares about Latvia, anyway?

Apparently the financial markets consider it a minnow in an ocean of liquidity. Stocks and bonds are all doing just fine today, thank you, while Latvia is having serious currency problems that threaten Sweden's banks, while the other Euro nations are strained themselves.

"Latvia's latest crisis unfolded as new data confirmed economic fragility across Europe, where nine countries -- including Germany and Italy -- drew warnings Wednesday from the European Commission for widening budget deficits."
(source: WSJ)

An analyst from Brown Brothers provides more detail of some of the austerity programs -- limiting liability of homeowners. Apparently no big deal to the West, since credit default swaps are down today.

It might very well be a perfect setup, as Jansen at Across the curve points out:

"Maybe all this means that we are setting up for a giant duration grab which will leave the curve far flatter than anyone though possible. Investors will delude themselves into thinking that there is no risk in a 10 year Treasury or a 30 year bond.

When everyone is in the pool someone will saunter by and throw a plugged in toaster into the deep end. It will surely end very ugly."
(Source: Across the curve)

To which someone created a fanciful depiction of the toaster in response. One can only wonder if the founders of Thinkorswim had this type of metaphor in mind when they got started. It certainly seems appropriate.

We believe the thinkers can use today's experience to gain a better understanding why it's prudent to discount the U.S. economy bashers, as it is clear that economic troubles in the U.S. are matched by the Eurozone troubles. There just isn't all that many places to flee to if you want to stay out of financial trouble.

So it's no wonder that even in the face of massive deficits in the U.S. all the way out to the visible horizon US Treasury prices hold their own. Even if it's true that the U.S. is a sinking boat, all the other boats have big holes in the hull, too. The U.S., being the biggest boat in the pool, will most likely be one of the last to soak it's passengers.

Where Is The Next Bubble?

Look out for the next round of "emerging markets".

In the late 90's the easy money policy coincided with the advent and new-found stability and strength of the Internet, pumping huge amounts of speculative money into dot-com ventures. In the early 00's, the easy money policy coincided with the advent of the new-found stability and strength of credit derivatives. Readers might recall Enron set the stage for a new way to look at derivatives, after which the same geniuses of mind that invented them for energy and bandwidth extrapolated the concept into credit markets like never before. The question for us today is what financial model has the same characteristics that make for speculative exploitation?

First, it must be global in nature -- accessible and understandable to every language, culture, and nation. The last two bubbles occurred everywhere. In fact, there isn't a single nation big enough to absorb all the money in the world by itself. We need a band-wagon big enough for the entire human race.

Second, it has to be relatively new, as in "iteration 3". It has to be a bit of a novelty for the commoner and limitless. Bubbles don't grow where there are walls or boundaries. The Internet iteration 1 was limited to academia nerds, with commoners intrigued by the mystery of the new concept. Iteration 2 of the Internet found some bold adventurists dabbling in newly invented business models that only a very few understood well enough to make sense of. By iteration 3, the commoners began to understand this new business from having been exposed to it as consumers in iteration 2. The Internet had no bounds. So when the easy money politics of Alan Greenspan kicked in, it was a no brainier for high-finance to use that cheap easy money to take extraordinary risk on new ventures into this emerging new opportunity called "The Internet".

In the case of credit markets, collateralized debt began with mortgage backed securities, invented and implemented first in the federal lending agencies created in the 1930s and later. In the 70s, securitization of those mortgages was invented. (source: "Introduction to Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS)"). For years they mostly sat their as a tool for the nerds of finance. With the advent and spread of computers, the agency bonds became a common investment playground of everyday finance. By the time Greenspan stepped in to rescue the markets from the dot-com bust with round two of ridiculously low interest rates, the collateralized debt instrument was so well established and proven it was now ready to exploit that cheap easy credit through the carry trade, in which even Japanese housewives were speculating.

Now that Ben Bernanke is fully entrenched with round three of subsidized and ridiculously low interest rates, where will that money go? It might very well be the Asian and South American emerging markets. In the '90s, a wave of free market economics swept the globe. The managed economy fell into disrepute. Small and large nations alike abandoned their commanding heights and implemented market reforms. In this iteration 1 of emerging markets, only the nerds of economics understood what was going on. No common investor in their right mind would gamble on such a large experiment in finance as to invest in a former dictatorship. By the time the collateralized debt machine was in place, these nations had established themselves as more than just a wild experiment. Their reforms actually appeared to be working. Business ventures in these nations seemed to be sticking. Policy official spoke the same language as industrial nations. Global trade and open markets were working. During the 2000's, the term "Emerging Market" and BRIC became reputable areas of interest for normal investment firms. Average investors were leery, but interested, and willing to dabble with 10% exposure to this "industry" as the bulk of their portfolio focused on Real Estate and domestic equities. Most importantly, they were learning the lingo of international investments and cursory knowledge of foreign economics.

Enter iteration 3 of emerging markets. The fuel for such an explosion could very well be the U.S. carry trade. If Bernanke can keep interest rates unnaturally low "for an extended period" like he has said, it just might fuel a new round of exploitation in those growing non-US markets, which would lock up huge amounts of US Dollar assets in foreign debt at absurdly low rates, and drive the price inflation we should have seen in the US into those other markets instead. The confirmation of this new bubble will be normal asset allocations in the high double digits in emerging markets by Western investors. The peak will come when taxi drivers and hair dressers share tips about the nations they are exploiting.

If Carry Trade Wave 2 is funded with dollars, we would not see significant price inflation in the US. Instead, price inflation will be "exported" to emerging markets as an ample supply of funds flows to them. Just as "credit risk" became a thing of the past in the last bubble, "foreign investment risk" would be a thing of the past in this bubble, as their GDPs explode in what would be sold as the new age of international trade. That would be the ultimate confirmation, when broker pitches include the assurance that foreign investment is nothing to fear as emerging nations support each other without the 'need' for the U.S. economy to sustain them.

Money Supply Blog

The Financial Times has a blog on Money Supply around the world. We haven't yet formed an opinion about it yet, but the graphic (logo?) is slightly innacurate in our estimation. That scafolding and framing holding up the nations should be a house of cards, not steel. Steel is SO-O-O 19th century!

The Business Cycle Continues

The last 12 months have seen unprecedented political, financial, and legal change in America and the world. Anyone who thinks they can make a 5-year expensive financial commitment today and go golfing is fooling themselves. Everything needs to be hedged and watched closely with a highly critical eye, with a strategy to get out and reverse course quickly.

The deleveraging angle so often touted as the required outcome from our recent past excesses is moot. There are two ways it can happen and the Fed has predictably chosen the unnatural path. The first way (the natural way) is credit contraction. Not just your favorite metric, but the entire scope across the globe. One thing the recent generation gets out of the new free-trade global economy is spreading of the costs of managed economies. No longer can one central bank destroy a nation through lousy policy as happened in the 90s. Now the consequences of lousy policies are dispersed globally.

The second way, the artificial way, is the course all industrial and developing nations are doing today: debasing the currency. This method works by keeping current-dollar credit values constant from artificial central-bank stimulated demand (see monetarism), but reducing the purchasing power of those dollars by dilution of the currency.

That's precisely why the U.S. economy is stabilizing, and that in turn stabilizes bonds across the spectrum. Oh yea, we will pay for it, but the piper isn't going to come calling in the next 12 months. He's lining up his resources to come charging in sometime in the next 3 or 4 years. The details of the intervention are different this time, but the pattern of replacing wealth destruction with new money (whether by fractional reserve credit expansion from absurdly low rates or direct injections of new reserves when rate intervention is insufficient) has been used over and over with the same outcome every time: economic boom followed by economic bust.

The boom is just starting. The really horrible bust that everyone is ranting about today won't hit us until about 3 or 4 years. You can see that pattern in any of your favorite long-term macro-economic charts.

Corporate Bond Rally May Stall Now

Today high-rated corporate bonds are trading just barely above government guaranteed bonds.

Yesterday we got a glimpse through Seeking Alpha just how far we've come in the last year.

At least at the top end of the rating scale, there's hardly room for any more contraction in spreads. The long term prospects for high-rated corporate bonds doesn't look good unless in fact Bernanke can actually overcome the forces of monetarism and keep real inflation at historical lows.

The best bet in bonds is the lower grade issues at this point. If high-grade rates remain low on a recovering economy from central bank purchase demands, those lower rated investment grade bonds will see continued contraction in spreads as default risk subsides. If high-grade rates rise while the economy recovers, lower rated investment grade bonds may not see declining yields, but contraction in spreads can still produce stable prices and above-inflation yields.

There are two primary risks, one of which is almost ignorable. The first is demise of the global economy, which is most unlikely but theoretically possible. For that scenario you better have backup food supplies, loads of currency (legal and barter) tucked under your mattress, and a plan for wilderness survival. The second is inflation rates rising to the point where low grade bonds fall in value with or without contracting yield spreads. This is much more likely than the former, and highly probably if Governments around the world don't back off their stimulus programs in rapid fashion.

The good news on the inflation story is monetarism reveals this kind of inflation takes 12 to 24 months to find it's way into consumer prices. At that point one will have to switch to inflation investing.

Until then, high yields, contracting spreads, and green shoots are the fundamentals one should be keeping their eyes on, and high yield investment grade bonds provide a tempting opportunity not often available with fundamental support like we have today.