Great news. Bank reserves have shown the first sign of change for the better.
For January, non-borrowed reserves have finally revealed a down tick. Sure, it's no big change, but it is the first sign. They've been steadily rising as the fed "adds reserves" (aka prints money) to buy agency debt. Note that this down-tick occurred in January while the fed was still adding reserves. That means banks are starting to lend again.
It's no surprise then that the TAF and discount rates were revised this week back toward pre-crisis conditions. No doubt the fed has better data than this nearly month-old update.
Friday, February 19, 2010
Get Paid To Move Your Positions
Normally if you want to transfer your securities from one account to another you have to pay a broker to do that for you. This is certainly a preferred method in taxable accounts, since selling in one and buying in another would trigger a tax consequence and possibly incur significant costs from commissions if you have a lot of positions to move. If your securities are in a tax sheltered account though, you can use options to move those securities and generate income rather than an expense.
Options sell at a premium. If the underlying price is $70.00 and you buy a put option with a strike price of $75, you can expect to pay more than $5.00 for the privileged of selling the position at a higher price than it is at the moment. You can use that to your advantage in this position moving scenario by selling the option in the account where you want the position to be at the same time you sell the underlying in the account you no longer want it.
Here's the dollars and cents of it:
Account A:
Sell 1000 XYZ for $70.00.
Income: $70,000
Account B:
Sell 10 XYZ front month in the money $75 puts for $5.30
Income: $5,300
At Expiration:
Assign $75 put.
Expense: $75,000
Net: $70,000 + $5,300 - $75,000 = $300.
Assuming you aren't doing business with Lame Broker's LLC, the $300 net gain should be well above the cost of commissions.
The key point is you need to make this move when the markets are stable and reasonably predictable so the underlying doesn't shoot up so much in price that your option does not get assigned (unless it is also desired that you be out of the position at the strike price anyway). The days immediately after earnings is a good time to do this as you will get a good idea of price direction, and most market moving surprises about the fundamentals of a company come out at that time.
Options sell at a premium. If the underlying price is $70.00 and you buy a put option with a strike price of $75, you can expect to pay more than $5.00 for the privileged of selling the position at a higher price than it is at the moment. You can use that to your advantage in this position moving scenario by selling the option in the account where you want the position to be at the same time you sell the underlying in the account you no longer want it.
Here's the dollars and cents of it:
Account A:
Sell 1000 XYZ for $70.00.
Income: $70,000
Account B:
Sell 10 XYZ front month in the money $75 puts for $5.30
Income: $5,300
At Expiration:
Assign $75 put.
Expense: $75,000
Net: $70,000 + $5,300 - $75,000 = $300.
Assuming you aren't doing business with Lame Broker's LLC, the $300 net gain should be well above the cost of commissions.
The key point is you need to make this move when the markets are stable and reasonably predictable so the underlying doesn't shoot up so much in price that your option does not get assigned (unless it is also desired that you be out of the position at the strike price anyway). The days immediately after earnings is a good time to do this as you will get a good idea of price direction, and most market moving surprises about the fundamentals of a company come out at that time.
Thursday, February 18, 2010
The Fed Did Not Raise Rates
Did the Federal Reserve just come out and surprise the world with a "rate hike"? Technically, yes. It all depends on what "is" is. Read the official press release.
Notice this isn't really changing the fundamentals. What really happened was they removed some of the recent "emergency" measures.
As we pointed out in "Credit Spreads Expected to Narrow", the business cycle is alive and well. The Federal Reserve basically just sent out a press release to that effect. They've restored the spread and duration to pre-crash conditions. Yea, the spread is still not quite there, but hopefully you get the picture.
This is a change at the discount window and TAF, not fed funds. Bernanke is pushing up that rate to force banks to suck up the fed funds and entice other bond holders to find repurchase funding in the commercial paper markets. We predict it won’t have any impact on lending costs just as they say (since fed funds are still over-supplied), but to the extent the public believes this is something big, there’s some good shorting opportunities for the next day or two.
This is more to do with normalizing the old methodologies than a real rate policy change. The daily Fed Funds market shows no signs whatsoever of "improving conditions" as far as market interest rates in ring-zero financing is concerned.
All through the policy changes leading up to market collapse the Fed Funds data revealed policy changes in the days leading up the public announcements. Expect to see something move there, too, before any real rate increases happens in monetary policy. As it stands the current news is just getting a few markets back to pre-crash normality.
Notice this isn't really changing the fundamentals. What really happened was they removed some of the recent "emergency" measures.
On August 17, 2007, the Federal Reserve reduced the spread of the primary credit rate over the FOMC's target for the federal funds rate to 1/2 percentage point, from 1 percentage point, and lengthened the typical maximum maturity from overnight to 30 days.
As we pointed out in "Credit Spreads Expected to Narrow", the business cycle is alive and well. The Federal Reserve basically just sent out a press release to that effect. They've restored the spread and duration to pre-crash conditions. Yea, the spread is still not quite there, but hopefully you get the picture.
This is a change at the discount window and TAF, not fed funds. Bernanke is pushing up that rate to force banks to suck up the fed funds and entice other bond holders to find repurchase funding in the commercial paper markets. We predict it won’t have any impact on lending costs just as they say (since fed funds are still over-supplied), but to the extent the public believes this is something big, there’s some good shorting opportunities for the next day or two.
This is more to do with normalizing the old methodologies than a real rate policy change. The daily Fed Funds market shows no signs whatsoever of "improving conditions" as far as market interest rates in ring-zero financing is concerned.
All through the policy changes leading up to market collapse the Fed Funds data revealed policy changes in the days leading up the public announcements. Expect to see something move there, too, before any real rate increases happens in monetary policy. As it stands the current news is just getting a few markets back to pre-crash normality.
Labels:
Banking,
Business Cycle,
Fed Funds,
Federal Reserve,
Interest Rates,
TALF
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Credit Spreads Expected to Narrow
This Time Is Not Different
The business cycle is alive and well. If you read the blogs and mainstream media you'll see a lot of bearish sentiment about the destruction of the American economy. Certain things won't be exactly like they were, but the interesting thing we see often is those bearish pessimists keep trying to discredit the optimists by pointing out the fallacy of "this time it's different", meaning this bubble isn't going to thrive any more than the last one.
Well, they're right on one count. The bubble won't thrive better than the last. But the one guilty of clinging to a fallacy are the bears. The "this time it's different" fallacy really points back at them. See, the bears are trying to sell us on the idea that "this time" the business cycle isn't going to happen. No sir, this time we've really shot ourselves and the stock market is just going to go right back down until the entire economic system of the world resets.
Well, maybe we exaggerate their point of view a little, but the essence is there. We contend the business cycle is alive and well and the prudent person will plan accordingly.
So how then do we interpret the budget deficits in light of the business cycle? For background on the business cycle of boom and bust one should go dig around at some of our favorite economic sites:
The Mises Institute
The Foundation for Economic Education
Cafe Hayek
Budget Deficits For Fun and Profit
Budget deficits necessitate a rise in interest rates. To attract money to Treasuries, the price has to fall since people will be competing for better returns in riskier assets. A lower price for Treasuries will attract that money to that instrument along some continuum of risk/reward which differs from one person to another. Meanwhile, the supply of Treasuries is going to be growing. To attract buyers then, the market has to push down the price of Treasuries.
On the off chance (slim as it is) that the government can’t attract buyers from the open market, the central bank will have to monetize the debt to prevent failed auctions. Hence, gold would be a good buy against U.S. dollar dilution by the central bank. This is not only true because of the recent past liquidity measures, but even more so for potential future liquidity efforts, if they arise.
Nevertheless, even if there are no more waves of quantitative easing, the last stimulus will be enough to create a wave of price inflation in the next five years. The recent sell-off in gold was simply profit taking and flight to cash on fears of Euro defaults, accentuated by program trading on the momentum and short term hysteria. Now that has subsided, we can get a wave of movement back toward long-term fundamental expectations based on centuries-old historical expectations of the boom-bust business cycle.
The beauty of this setup is that it implies higher risk in Treasuries than historical norms. Higher risk between Treasuries and corporate bonds means the spread between Treasury and corporate will narrow to the extent that businesses still know how to run a sound business. This translates to basic business-cycle fundamentals acting in opposite directions on the two sides of the spread.
Even though Keynes may not have had the big picture well understood when it comes to long term health of the economy, he was not wrong that government deficit spending stimulates demand for goods and services in the marketplace. Demand for goods and services in the marketplace is good for “business”, which translates into improving business credit default risk as cash flows improve for them.
Given then improving business credit default risks with degrading government credit default risk, we have a nice scenario that translates into narrowing credit spreads between so called "risk free" Treasuries and business risk corporates.
We're not trying to sell the value of the business cycle, or suggest it's a good thing. We simply want to point out it is alive and well. The fundamental factors that create it in the first place aren't gone. Names change and leaders switch places, but the same system that brought us all the other booms and bubbles is going to give you another one. We happen to think the global Q/E policies of every modern nation on the planet is going to make this next one a doozie. The good news is you have plenty of time to prepare for the pop and chaos that ensues from the bust.
For a more entertaining perspective, check out the viral video "Fear the Boom and Bust".
Labels:
Bonds,
Business Cycle,
Global Economy,
Inflation,
Interest Rates,
Strategy
Friday, February 5, 2010
Can demand for credit derivatives really lead to economic decline?
If we read the attempted implications of "Bond Market Vigilantes Sink Stocks" right, Mr. Mirhaydari claims the surge in the CDS market is threatening to raise interest rates on sovereign debt, which will force governments to cut spending and raise taxes to counter the cost of debt, which leads to a double dip recession, which leads to a falling stock market.
It makes perfect sense except for the part about politicians giving any hoot at all about the cost of their debt. Europe certainly has rules about limited deficit spending, but does anyone else that matters to global growth have such constraints?
Still, if the rush for CDS instruments is really the impetus behind recent market movements, that money flow will eventually unwind as the speculators take their profits and look for another ride to get excited about. Maybe the only real connection that makes sense is that institutions that have the clout to speculate with CDS, bonds, equities, and commodities all over the world have found a nice little emotional roller coaster to take out for a spin, after which they’ll whipsaw the markets and ride something else up to hysterical levels when they are ready to take profit out of the CDS markets.
If Mirhaydari is correct we'll see people talking about S&P 500 at 600 within a few months. If our secondary supposition is correct, we should see a strong rebound in stocks and commodities before summer. According to Jim Jubak's analysis of leading and lagging indicators, the latter appears more plausible.
It makes perfect sense except for the part about politicians giving any hoot at all about the cost of their debt. Europe certainly has rules about limited deficit spending, but does anyone else that matters to global growth have such constraints?
Still, if the rush for CDS instruments is really the impetus behind recent market movements, that money flow will eventually unwind as the speculators take their profits and look for another ride to get excited about. Maybe the only real connection that makes sense is that institutions that have the clout to speculate with CDS, bonds, equities, and commodities all over the world have found a nice little emotional roller coaster to take out for a spin, after which they’ll whipsaw the markets and ride something else up to hysterical levels when they are ready to take profit out of the CDS markets.
If Mirhaydari is correct we'll see people talking about S&P 500 at 600 within a few months. If our secondary supposition is correct, we should see a strong rebound in stocks and commodities before summer. According to Jim Jubak's analysis of leading and lagging indicators, the latter appears more plausible.
Labels:
Commodities,
Credit Default Swaps,
Global Economy,
Speculation,
Stocks
Thursday, December 3, 2009
SPX Created Five Gaps Since 11/6 - The Chaos Indicator.
Count the gap-open on the S&P500 recently since November 6th. Notice how the chart (OHLC bar style) looks like a very unstable thinly-traded security. We count five gap-opens since the close on November 6th. If we fill that gap (which hasn't happened yet) it would put the SPX very close to the lower bound of the Bollinger-band.
Is there a technical formula that measures "chaos"? That's what the chart looks like since early November. If the chaos factor were high, would it be a bearish or bullish indicator? Intuition suggests bearish since it indicates indecisiveness, and selling and holding cash when you aren't sure what to do is easier than buying and holding risk when you have no firm conviction.
Is there a technical formula that measures "chaos"? That's what the chart looks like since early November. If the chaos factor were high, would it be a bearish or bullish indicator? Intuition suggests bearish since it indicates indecisiveness, and selling and holding cash when you aren't sure what to do is easier than buying and holding risk when you have no firm conviction.
Labels:
Stocks,
Technical Indicators
Saturday, November 21, 2009
The Fear Factor
The following isn't technically a technical indicator discussion, but looking at the pattern of the current five month bull market from Bespoke Investment Group, we get the sense that both bulls and bears fear factor of being wrong and missing out on the big move is getting stronger.
We couldn't help but notice the length of the candles getting longer and more regular. Notice especially the first test of 1100 and the ensuing test of the 50 day SMA.
The run-ups are for the most part slow and steady (until the most recent one) and the pullbacks fast and furious. But notice the pullbacks almost always have strong up days trying to fight them.
Conclusion 1: the old adage that it's easier for the market to fall than rise is clearly seen. This is because pulling money out is easier than taking the risk of committing money and having it decline. Cash never declines in value (please, don't even think of starting a tangential diatribe about the dollar. We're talking about a two variable, and only two variable, equation: dollar priced SPX vs dollars, period.)
Conclusion 2: The 50-day and 1100 support and resistance points have become "sticky", both of them. In the last three areas where the price has approached either point the market did not want to move away from that point in either direction. There is very strong sentiment in both directions.
Monday will be interesting. We're expecting some volatile sideways movement as the moving average rises to the 1100 mark. Besides the technical aspects of that, the price range of indecision during the last three tests is awfully close to the range of price between support and resistance.
The ideal scenario would be sideways motion from now to end of year with SMA(50) rising up to 1100 without a strong breakout. That would give us some very nice income on our bi-directional short put strategy and top off our year with close to 20% gain so we can go flat around the new year and catch our breath, waiting out the market's indecisiveness and getting some sense of economic effects on corporate America during January earnings season.
While we're not one of those who subscribe to belief in the end of the financial world as we know it, the 10-year chart on SPX suggests this push off the bottom has come faster, straighter, and longer than the 2003 recovery. It is also clear the sell off was equally more straight. So one would expect a fast straight reversion to some equilibrium point. Because of that, our sentiment for the next few months is sideways/down for a few months as opposed to our current sideways/up sentiment. However, during 2006 we were bearish on the premise that the market can't just go straight up for a year without any correction, and was clearly proven wrong. We'll never say never again. [roll theme song]
My name's Bond ... Jade Bond.
We couldn't help but notice the length of the candles getting longer and more regular. Notice especially the first test of 1100 and the ensuing test of the 50 day SMA.
The run-ups are for the most part slow and steady (until the most recent one) and the pullbacks fast and furious. But notice the pullbacks almost always have strong up days trying to fight them.
Conclusion 1: the old adage that it's easier for the market to fall than rise is clearly seen. This is because pulling money out is easier than taking the risk of committing money and having it decline. Cash never declines in value (please, don't even think of starting a tangential diatribe about the dollar. We're talking about a two variable, and only two variable, equation: dollar priced SPX vs dollars, period.)
Conclusion 2: The 50-day and 1100 support and resistance points have become "sticky", both of them. In the last three areas where the price has approached either point the market did not want to move away from that point in either direction. There is very strong sentiment in both directions.
Monday will be interesting. We're expecting some volatile sideways movement as the moving average rises to the 1100 mark. Besides the technical aspects of that, the price range of indecision during the last three tests is awfully close to the range of price between support and resistance.
The ideal scenario would be sideways motion from now to end of year with SMA(50) rising up to 1100 without a strong breakout. That would give us some very nice income on our bi-directional short put strategy and top off our year with close to 20% gain so we can go flat around the new year and catch our breath, waiting out the market's indecisiveness and getting some sense of economic effects on corporate America during January earnings season.
While we're not one of those who subscribe to belief in the end of the financial world as we know it, the 10-year chart on SPX suggests this push off the bottom has come faster, straighter, and longer than the 2003 recovery. It is also clear the sell off was equally more straight. So one would expect a fast straight reversion to some equilibrium point. Because of that, our sentiment for the next few months is sideways/down for a few months as opposed to our current sideways/up sentiment. However, during 2006 we were bearish on the premise that the market can't just go straight up for a year without any correction, and was clearly proven wrong. We'll never say never again. [roll theme song]
My name's Bond ... Jade Bond.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Profit Taking Rules the Day
It appears the last two days saw big moves upward in all of the following:
10 and 30 year U.S. Treasurys
GLD
DBB
FXE
SPY
DIA
QQQQ
Stocks, bonds, commodities, everything on a roll at the same time. This can't be a sentiment shift (since Treasurys typically move the inverse of equities.) Our guess is derivative profit taking is pushing up underlying securities.
10 and 30 year U.S. Treasurys
GLD
DBB
FXE
SPY
DIA
QQQQ
Stocks, bonds, commodities, everything on a roll at the same time. This can't be a sentiment shift (since Treasurys typically move the inverse of equities.) Our guess is derivative profit taking is pushing up underlying securities.
Labels:
Bonds,
Commodities,
Currency,
Exchange Traded Funds,
Stocks
Friday, November 13, 2009
Where did all this money come from?
Has anyone else been watching this and have a specific explanation other than "the banks aren't lending". Seriously, where did 400 billion dollars come from in the last two months?
Non-borrowed reserves in the last two months have jumped from around 400 billion to around 800 billion.
Who's pumping money into the banking system?
Oh, and did you notice the shaded recession period is in the past. Somehow we missed that announcement, but we did observe something similar on November 10th.
Non-borrowed reserves in the last two months have jumped from around 400 billion to around 800 billion.
Who's pumping money into the banking system?
Oh, and did you notice the shaded recession period is in the past. Somehow we missed that announcement, but we did observe something similar on November 10th.
Labels:
Banking,
Federal Reserve
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Contagion: Been There, Done That
If you haven't seen Commanding Heights, we highly recommend it. It goes best with a strong thinking cap so you can read between the lines and find the subtle nuances of cause and effect in global finance.
I part three in particular, they covered the Asian Financial Crisis that started from a small little economy, that through currency controls created the exact same financial situation we had last year (don't miss the entire city built from the ground up on debt financing to which no one ever moved in to populate!), and as the piper came calling and financiers decided they were no longer going to sing that tune, it spread to all the healthy nations in the region as electronic funds transfers sucked all the money out of the region, one nation after another.
The funny thing is, that time the money needed a place to park, so it fled to another emerging nation -- Russia. They didn't go into details on the underlying reasons for Russia's default on debt, but ultimately it lead to Long Term Capital's implosion.
And then Brazil was hard on its heals with another collapse in this game of financial dominoes, but was averted by a quick influx of bail out money as the signs of stress were about to crack.
In every case: bail out after bail out after bail out.
The difference in 2008 was apparently "they" (those with all the money under control) learned how not to make the same mistake. When credit stopped in 2008, the money this time went straight to U.S. Dollars. No messing around this time with some new emerging entity that offered hope and promise of the perfect utopia. Instead, get out, park the money in the one nation and one security most likely to not have a political revolution over the hub-bub, and wait it out.
So in spite of all the uproar over Federal Reserve emergency lending and government bail out of banks in 2008, it really was not unprecedented. It was exactly what was done the last time. The only difference being this time it was an internal massive bailout instead of foreign nation massive bailouts. We contend the labels on the entities in question are irrelevant. It's the same thing every time (remember the third-world financial bail outs in the 80s?) Apparently it's a necessary evil every decade.
There is nothing new under the sun. Watch it, learn to read the signs, and get ready for a repeat since the fundamental foundations, the global monetary systems, haven't changed one bit. The hard part is learning how to discount and ignore the incessant monthly claims that "it's going to happen again!! Sell now and protect yourself!!!"
Meanwhile, like last time, it appears the contagion has stopped spreading. See our other post today, The Financial Crisis of 2008 is Officially Over.
We left out one interesting link on those references though. Just as Brazil's contagion was contained by preemptive quick response, The Fed has preempted the Commercial Real Estate issues that are falling on the heals of this most recent global financial crisis. Like Brazil's non-issue of the 90s, we predict the present CRE "crisis" will also become a little known financial issue of 2010.
In a nutshell, banks can restructure the loans and won't be "criticized" for what otherwise would have been bad lending practices. It's now OK to carry bad debt on the books.
Just like Japan? Well, not exactly. Turns out we can learn another important fact from Commanding Heights. In the 90s, when Japan's banks were stuck with all those bad loans, one bold man stood up and suggested if they want to get out of the crisis they need to loosen up the over-bearing burdensome regulatory structure that was constraining the banks. He was quickly fired from his cabinet post, they refused to "fix" the systemic problem, and the lost decade ensued.
If Benny and Timmy had nationalized the banks in the U.S. to "solve" our crisis and put massive layers of regulation on them (as if you can implement "Soviet Union Economics" and create vital capital formation) then we would have been destined for a lost decade in the U.S. as well. Instead, we have a much better chance of getting back to normal, which is setting ourselves up for another crisis in the teens of the 21st century just like the previous three decades.
I part three in particular, they covered the Asian Financial Crisis that started from a small little economy, that through currency controls created the exact same financial situation we had last year (don't miss the entire city built from the ground up on debt financing to which no one ever moved in to populate!), and as the piper came calling and financiers decided they were no longer going to sing that tune, it spread to all the healthy nations in the region as electronic funds transfers sucked all the money out of the region, one nation after another.
The funny thing is, that time the money needed a place to park, so it fled to another emerging nation -- Russia. They didn't go into details on the underlying reasons for Russia's default on debt, but ultimately it lead to Long Term Capital's implosion.
And then Brazil was hard on its heals with another collapse in this game of financial dominoes, but was averted by a quick influx of bail out money as the signs of stress were about to crack.
In every case: bail out after bail out after bail out.
The difference in 2008 was apparently "they" (those with all the money under control) learned how not to make the same mistake. When credit stopped in 2008, the money this time went straight to U.S. Dollars. No messing around this time with some new emerging entity that offered hope and promise of the perfect utopia. Instead, get out, park the money in the one nation and one security most likely to not have a political revolution over the hub-bub, and wait it out.
So in spite of all the uproar over Federal Reserve emergency lending and government bail out of banks in 2008, it really was not unprecedented. It was exactly what was done the last time. The only difference being this time it was an internal massive bailout instead of foreign nation massive bailouts. We contend the labels on the entities in question are irrelevant. It's the same thing every time (remember the third-world financial bail outs in the 80s?) Apparently it's a necessary evil every decade.
There is nothing new under the sun. Watch it, learn to read the signs, and get ready for a repeat since the fundamental foundations, the global monetary systems, haven't changed one bit. The hard part is learning how to discount and ignore the incessant monthly claims that "it's going to happen again!! Sell now and protect yourself!!!"
Meanwhile, like last time, it appears the contagion has stopped spreading. See our other post today, The Financial Crisis of 2008 is Officially Over.
We left out one interesting link on those references though. Just as Brazil's contagion was contained by preemptive quick response, The Fed has preempted the Commercial Real Estate issues that are falling on the heals of this most recent global financial crisis. Like Brazil's non-issue of the 90s, we predict the present CRE "crisis" will also become a little known financial issue of 2010.
In a nutshell, banks can restructure the loans and won't be "criticized" for what otherwise would have been bad lending practices. It's now OK to carry bad debt on the books.
Just like Japan? Well, not exactly. Turns out we can learn another important fact from Commanding Heights. In the 90s, when Japan's banks were stuck with all those bad loans, one bold man stood up and suggested if they want to get out of the crisis they need to loosen up the over-bearing burdensome regulatory structure that was constraining the banks. He was quickly fired from his cabinet post, they refused to "fix" the systemic problem, and the lost decade ensued.
If Benny and Timmy had nationalized the banks in the U.S. to "solve" our crisis and put massive layers of regulation on them (as if you can implement "Soviet Union Economics" and create vital capital formation) then we would have been destined for a lost decade in the U.S. as well. Instead, we have a much better chance of getting back to normal, which is setting ourselves up for another crisis in the teens of the 21st century just like the previous three decades.
Labels:
Banking,
Currency,
Emerging Markets,
Global Economy
The Financial Crisis of 2008 is Officially Over
On Friday of last week:
Then today:
Update 11/18/2009
The Federal Reserve Board announced Friday that a temporary exemption to the limitations in section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, instituted as part of the response to the financial crisis, will expire as scheduled on October 30, 2009
(source: 2009 Banking and Consumer Regulatory Policy)
Then today:
9 of the 10 Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) that were determined in the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) earlier this year to need to raise capital or improve the quality of their capital to withstand a worse-than-expected economic scenario now have increased their capital sufficiently to meet or exceed their required capital buffers. The one exception, GMAC, is expected to meet its remaining buffer need by accessing the TARP Automotive Industry Financing Program, and is in discussions with the U.S. Treasury on the structure of its investment
(source: 2009 Banking and Consumer Regulatory Policy)
Update 11/18/2009
In light of the continued improvement in financial market conditions, the Federal Reserve Board on Tuesday announced that it approved a reduction in the maximum maturity of primary credit loans...
Prior to August 2007, the maximum available term of primary credit was generally overnight. The Federal Reserve lengthened the maximum maturity first to 30 days on August 17, 2007 and then to 90 days on March 16, 2008...
(source: Federal Reserve Press Release)
Labels:
Banking,
Federal Reserve,
Global Economy
Thursday, October 8, 2009
Who cares about Latvia, anyway?
Apparently the financial markets consider it a minnow in an ocean of liquidity. Stocks and bonds are all doing just fine today, thank you, while Latvia is having serious currency problems that threaten Sweden's banks, while the other Euro nations are strained themselves.
It might very well be a perfect setup, as Jansen at Across the curve points out:
We believe the thinkers can use today's experience to gain a better understanding why it's prudent to discount the U.S. economy bashers, as it is clear that economic troubles in the U.S. are matched by the Eurozone troubles. There just isn't all that many places to flee to if you want to stay out of financial trouble.
So it's no wonder that even in the face of massive deficits in the U.S. all the way out to the visible horizon US Treasury prices hold their own. Even if it's true that the U.S. is a sinking boat, all the other boats have big holes in the hull, too. The U.S., being the biggest boat in the pool, will most likely be one of the last to soak it's passengers.
"Latvia's latest crisis unfolded as new data confirmed economic fragility across Europe, where nine countries -- including Germany and Italy -- drew warnings Wednesday from the European Commission for widening budget deficits."An analyst from Brown Brothers provides more detail of some of the austerity programs -- limiting liability of homeowners. Apparently no big deal to the West, since credit default swaps are down today.
(source: WSJ)
It might very well be a perfect setup, as Jansen at Across the curve points out:
"Maybe all this means that we are setting up for a giant duration grab which will leave the curve far flatter than anyone though possible. Investors will delude themselves into thinking that there is no risk in a 10 year Treasury or a 30 year bond.To which someone created a fanciful depiction of the toaster in response. One can only wonder if the founders of Thinkorswim had this type of metaphor in mind when they got started. It certainly seems appropriate.
When everyone is in the pool someone will saunter by and throw a plugged in toaster into the deep end. It will surely end very ugly."
(Source: Across the curve)
We believe the thinkers can use today's experience to gain a better understanding why it's prudent to discount the U.S. economy bashers, as it is clear that economic troubles in the U.S. are matched by the Eurozone troubles. There just isn't all that many places to flee to if you want to stay out of financial trouble.
So it's no wonder that even in the face of massive deficits in the U.S. all the way out to the visible horizon US Treasury prices hold their own. Even if it's true that the U.S. is a sinking boat, all the other boats have big holes in the hull, too. The U.S., being the biggest boat in the pool, will most likely be one of the last to soak it's passengers.
Labels:
Bonds,
Currency,
Emerging Markets,
Global Economy
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
Where Is The Next Bubble?
Look out for the next round of "emerging markets".
In the late 90's the easy money policy coincided with the advent and new-found stability and strength of the Internet, pumping huge amounts of speculative money into dot-com ventures. In the early 00's, the easy money policy coincided with the advent of the new-found stability and strength of credit derivatives. Readers might recall Enron set the stage for a new way to look at derivatives, after which the same geniuses of mind that invented them for energy and bandwidth extrapolated the concept into credit markets like never before. The question for us today is what financial model has the same characteristics that make for speculative exploitation?
First, it must be global in nature -- accessible and understandable to every language, culture, and nation. The last two bubbles occurred everywhere. In fact, there isn't a single nation big enough to absorb all the money in the world by itself. We need a band-wagon big enough for the entire human race.
Second, it has to be relatively new, as in "iteration 3". It has to be a bit of a novelty for the commoner and limitless. Bubbles don't grow where there are walls or boundaries. The Internet iteration 1 was limited to academia nerds, with commoners intrigued by the mystery of the new concept. Iteration 2 of the Internet found some bold adventurists dabbling in newly invented business models that only a very few understood well enough to make sense of. By iteration 3, the commoners began to understand this new business from having been exposed to it as consumers in iteration 2. The Internet had no bounds. So when the easy money politics of Alan Greenspan kicked in, it was a no brainier for high-finance to use that cheap easy money to take extraordinary risk on new ventures into this emerging new opportunity called "The Internet".
In the case of credit markets, collateralized debt began with mortgage backed securities, invented and implemented first in the federal lending agencies created in the 1930s and later. In the 70s, securitization of those mortgages was invented. (source: "Introduction to Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS)"). For years they mostly sat their as a tool for the nerds of finance. With the advent and spread of computers, the agency bonds became a common investment playground of everyday finance. By the time Greenspan stepped in to rescue the markets from the dot-com bust with round two of ridiculously low interest rates, the collateralized debt instrument was so well established and proven it was now ready to exploit that cheap easy credit through the carry trade, in which even Japanese housewives were speculating.
Now that Ben Bernanke is fully entrenched with round three of subsidized and ridiculously low interest rates, where will that money go? It might very well be the Asian and South American emerging markets. In the '90s, a wave of free market economics swept the globe. The managed economy fell into disrepute. Small and large nations alike abandoned their commanding heights and implemented market reforms. In this iteration 1 of emerging markets, only the nerds of economics understood what was going on. No common investor in their right mind would gamble on such a large experiment in finance as to invest in a former dictatorship. By the time the collateralized debt machine was in place, these nations had established themselves as more than just a wild experiment. Their reforms actually appeared to be working. Business ventures in these nations seemed to be sticking. Policy official spoke the same language as industrial nations. Global trade and open markets were working. During the 2000's, the term "Emerging Market" and BRIC became reputable areas of interest for normal investment firms. Average investors were leery, but interested, and willing to dabble with 10% exposure to this "industry" as the bulk of their portfolio focused on Real Estate and domestic equities. Most importantly, they were learning the lingo of international investments and cursory knowledge of foreign economics.
Enter iteration 3 of emerging markets. The fuel for such an explosion could very well be the U.S. carry trade. If Bernanke can keep interest rates unnaturally low "for an extended period" like he has said, it just might fuel a new round of exploitation in those growing non-US markets, which would lock up huge amounts of US Dollar assets in foreign debt at absurdly low rates, and drive the price inflation we should have seen in the US into those other markets instead. The confirmation of this new bubble will be normal asset allocations in the high double digits in emerging markets by Western investors. The peak will come when taxi drivers and hair dressers share tips about the nations they are exploiting.
If Carry Trade Wave 2 is funded with dollars, we would not see significant price inflation in the US. Instead, price inflation will be "exported" to emerging markets as an ample supply of funds flows to them. Just as "credit risk" became a thing of the past in the last bubble, "foreign investment risk" would be a thing of the past in this bubble, as their GDPs explode in what would be sold as the new age of international trade. That would be the ultimate confirmation, when broker pitches include the assurance that foreign investment is nothing to fear as emerging nations support each other without the 'need' for the U.S. economy to sustain them.
In the late 90's the easy money policy coincided with the advent and new-found stability and strength of the Internet, pumping huge amounts of speculative money into dot-com ventures. In the early 00's, the easy money policy coincided with the advent of the new-found stability and strength of credit derivatives. Readers might recall Enron set the stage for a new way to look at derivatives, after which the same geniuses of mind that invented them for energy and bandwidth extrapolated the concept into credit markets like never before. The question for us today is what financial model has the same characteristics that make for speculative exploitation?
First, it must be global in nature -- accessible and understandable to every language, culture, and nation. The last two bubbles occurred everywhere. In fact, there isn't a single nation big enough to absorb all the money in the world by itself. We need a band-wagon big enough for the entire human race.
Second, it has to be relatively new, as in "iteration 3". It has to be a bit of a novelty for the commoner and limitless. Bubbles don't grow where there are walls or boundaries. The Internet iteration 1 was limited to academia nerds, with commoners intrigued by the mystery of the new concept. Iteration 2 of the Internet found some bold adventurists dabbling in newly invented business models that only a very few understood well enough to make sense of. By iteration 3, the commoners began to understand this new business from having been exposed to it as consumers in iteration 2. The Internet had no bounds. So when the easy money politics of Alan Greenspan kicked in, it was a no brainier for high-finance to use that cheap easy money to take extraordinary risk on new ventures into this emerging new opportunity called "The Internet".
In the case of credit markets, collateralized debt began with mortgage backed securities, invented and implemented first in the federal lending agencies created in the 1930s and later. In the 70s, securitization of those mortgages was invented. (source: "Introduction to Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS)"). For years they mostly sat their as a tool for the nerds of finance. With the advent and spread of computers, the agency bonds became a common investment playground of everyday finance. By the time Greenspan stepped in to rescue the markets from the dot-com bust with round two of ridiculously low interest rates, the collateralized debt instrument was so well established and proven it was now ready to exploit that cheap easy credit through the carry trade, in which even Japanese housewives were speculating.
Now that Ben Bernanke is fully entrenched with round three of subsidized and ridiculously low interest rates, where will that money go? It might very well be the Asian and South American emerging markets. In the '90s, a wave of free market economics swept the globe. The managed economy fell into disrepute. Small and large nations alike abandoned their commanding heights and implemented market reforms. In this iteration 1 of emerging markets, only the nerds of economics understood what was going on. No common investor in their right mind would gamble on such a large experiment in finance as to invest in a former dictatorship. By the time the collateralized debt machine was in place, these nations had established themselves as more than just a wild experiment. Their reforms actually appeared to be working. Business ventures in these nations seemed to be sticking. Policy official spoke the same language as industrial nations. Global trade and open markets were working. During the 2000's, the term "Emerging Market" and BRIC became reputable areas of interest for normal investment firms. Average investors were leery, but interested, and willing to dabble with 10% exposure to this "industry" as the bulk of their portfolio focused on Real Estate and domestic equities. Most importantly, they were learning the lingo of international investments and cursory knowledge of foreign economics.
Enter iteration 3 of emerging markets. The fuel for such an explosion could very well be the U.S. carry trade. If Bernanke can keep interest rates unnaturally low "for an extended period" like he has said, it just might fuel a new round of exploitation in those growing non-US markets, which would lock up huge amounts of US Dollar assets in foreign debt at absurdly low rates, and drive the price inflation we should have seen in the US into those other markets instead. The confirmation of this new bubble will be normal asset allocations in the high double digits in emerging markets by Western investors. The peak will come when taxi drivers and hair dressers share tips about the nations they are exploiting.
If Carry Trade Wave 2 is funded with dollars, we would not see significant price inflation in the US. Instead, price inflation will be "exported" to emerging markets as an ample supply of funds flows to them. Just as "credit risk" became a thing of the past in the last bubble, "foreign investment risk" would be a thing of the past in this bubble, as their GDPs explode in what would be sold as the new age of international trade. That would be the ultimate confirmation, when broker pitches include the assurance that foreign investment is nothing to fear as emerging nations support each other without the 'need' for the U.S. economy to sustain them.
Labels:
Currency,
Emerging Markets,
Global Economy,
MBS
Thursday, September 24, 2009
Don't Ask, Don't Tell
Putting a new twist the common vernacular ...
Subtitle: "Why we need to keep our operations hush-hush secret", by Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, United States Federal Reserve Bank, in testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C, September 25, 2009.
If you don't believe me, you can read the full text of the prepared speech for yourself as we've linked to it above. Or you can just believe me when I say the basic message is, "Trust me, we do all this for your own good. These aren't the drones you're looking for. You can go about your business."
Don't ask why we're on a Star Wars kick this week. It just seems to be working out that way. May the force be with you.
Subtitle: "Why we need to keep our operations hush-hush secret", by Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, United States Federal Reserve Bank, in testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C, September 25, 2009.
If you don't believe me, you can read the full text of the prepared speech for yourself as we've linked to it above. Or you can just believe me when I say the basic message is, "Trust me, we do all this for your own good. These aren't the drones you're looking for. You can go about your business."
Don't ask why we're on a Star Wars kick this week. It just seems to be working out that way. May the force be with you.
Labels:
Federal Reserve
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
Embrace Your Feelings
That’s the wisdom from “Old Ben” of Star Wars fame as he tried to take down the Evil Empire's death star. Looks like the nation of France is embracing The Force after all these years as they try to take down the Evil Empire's death star “players”.
I'm sure it's just a coincidence the author of "France to count happiness in GDP" at the Financial Times is Ben Hall.
The Economic Policy Journal blog has a free summary of the news.
I'm sure it's just a coincidence the author of "France to count happiness in GDP" at the Financial Times is Ben Hall.
The Economic Policy Journal blog has a free summary of the news.
Money Supply Blog
The Financial Times has a blog on Money Supply around the world. We haven't yet formed an opinion about it yet, but the graphic (logo?) is slightly innacurate in our estimation. That scafolding and framing holding up the nations should be a house of cards, not steel. Steel is SO-O-O 19th century!
Labels:
Banking,
Currency,
Global Economy
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
Bond Fundamental Shift on the Horizon
Not sure if this horizon is near or far, but it will be an interesting experience when we get there.
Sources say the Fed is in secretive talks with bondSo if the Fed is delivering inventory into the system, and the Federal Government is issuing new inventory into the system, how exactly are interest rates supposed to stay low for an extended period if this horizon is not equally far away?
dealers to restart "reverse repurchase agreements" in an effort to siphon
some of the $1T-or-so it's pumped into the economy. Unused since last December, reverse repos take cash out of circulation when the Fed sells securities to its 18 primary dealers for a set duration.
(source: SeekingAlpha).
Labels:
Bonds,
Federal Reserve,
Interest Rates
Monday, September 21, 2009
Why Everyone Is So Bullish on Gold
Cliff Wachtel at Seeking Alpha asked the question today, why are "speculators" buying so much gold while "professionals" are shorting?
It appears to us he fails to realize (or he's obfuscating his real understandings for some journalistic reason) the broader fundamental nature of where prices and value come from. By that we mean the fundamental nature as described by Ludwig von Mises' in Human Action.
In the fall of 2008, the Federal Reserve made it abundantly clear that they would stop at nothing to ensure they could control all financial markets and keep dollars flowing. Finally, after the success at keeping security markets open, they found themselves with functional markets but little or no demand for debt. As money piled up in accounts of all kinds, they then had to worry about the collapse of money velocity.
There is absolutely only one way to make money moving -- punish anyone who doesn't trade it (spend it) in exchange for non-money. Since they have no legislative power, the only tool is debasement and negative interest rates (charging savers for storing money instead of rewarding them with interest payments).
Debasement was easy -- in Dec '08 and Jan '09 they announced unprecedented (in the U.S.) money creation schemes in the purchase of agency debt and U.S. Treasurys. Negative interest rates seemed to manifest themselves by the nature of the credit crisis.
So we now find ourselves in an environment where holding cash carries a risk that has to be weighed against the risks of buying bonds, stocks, commodities, or anything else. Furthermore, add to the equation the necessity of businesses of all kinds to produce a ROI above single digits, and the natural inclination is to buy something that has potential for price appreciation or income. It's no surprise to us in this light, that equities and bonds are showing price strength in spite of so many macro-economic weaknesses and the fragility of all those green shoots.
Enjoy for now the fact that institutions are doing the buying of equities, bonds, and commodities. When the higher costs of the latter start squeezing business profits, they will either have to raise producer and consumer prices or suffer systemic business losses.
In the former case, PPI and CPI go up, which means the risk of "holding cash" now hits consumers with inflation -- they will start spending their cash before it's purchasing power disappears, empowering producers to raise prices (the ultimate feedback loop). In the case of the latter, shrinking profit margins will be bad for equities, which religiously motivates another round of policy changes to "stimulate" the economy, further devaluing (diluting) cash (i.e. dollars).
Very few choices today will provide price support for purchases in either scenario of inflation or economic stimulation (i.e. more currency debasement). One of them is precious metals and their centuries-old reliability as a store of value. It's not a coincidence that some sovereign nations are thinking of gold again as they did before the prevalence of fiat currencies and floating exchange rates. The only major institutions who seem to be bucking that trend are the biggest institutions in traditional western industrial regions who pin all their hopes on fiat currencies. They are the bankers and commercial traders Cliff refers to in his post.
Update Sept 22:
ColdCore now reports at SeekingAlpha some details about those other sovereign nations and their interest in acquiring the "real money" that the west shuns.
It appears to us he fails to realize (or he's obfuscating his real understandings for some journalistic reason) the broader fundamental nature of where prices and value come from. By that we mean the fundamental nature as described by Ludwig von Mises' in Human Action.
In the fall of 2008, the Federal Reserve made it abundantly clear that they would stop at nothing to ensure they could control all financial markets and keep dollars flowing. Finally, after the success at keeping security markets open, they found themselves with functional markets but little or no demand for debt. As money piled up in accounts of all kinds, they then had to worry about the collapse of money velocity.
There is absolutely only one way to make money moving -- punish anyone who doesn't trade it (spend it) in exchange for non-money. Since they have no legislative power, the only tool is debasement and negative interest rates (charging savers for storing money instead of rewarding them with interest payments).
Debasement was easy -- in Dec '08 and Jan '09 they announced unprecedented (in the U.S.) money creation schemes in the purchase of agency debt and U.S. Treasurys. Negative interest rates seemed to manifest themselves by the nature of the credit crisis.
So we now find ourselves in an environment where holding cash carries a risk that has to be weighed against the risks of buying bonds, stocks, commodities, or anything else. Furthermore, add to the equation the necessity of businesses of all kinds to produce a ROI above single digits, and the natural inclination is to buy something that has potential for price appreciation or income. It's no surprise to us in this light, that equities and bonds are showing price strength in spite of so many macro-economic weaknesses and the fragility of all those green shoots.
Enjoy for now the fact that institutions are doing the buying of equities, bonds, and commodities. When the higher costs of the latter start squeezing business profits, they will either have to raise producer and consumer prices or suffer systemic business losses.
In the former case, PPI and CPI go up, which means the risk of "holding cash" now hits consumers with inflation -- they will start spending their cash before it's purchasing power disappears, empowering producers to raise prices (the ultimate feedback loop). In the case of the latter, shrinking profit margins will be bad for equities, which religiously motivates another round of policy changes to "stimulate" the economy, further devaluing (diluting) cash (i.e. dollars).
Very few choices today will provide price support for purchases in either scenario of inflation or economic stimulation (i.e. more currency debasement). One of them is precious metals and their centuries-old reliability as a store of value. It's not a coincidence that some sovereign nations are thinking of gold again as they did before the prevalence of fiat currencies and floating exchange rates. The only major institutions who seem to be bucking that trend are the biggest institutions in traditional western industrial regions who pin all their hopes on fiat currencies. They are the bankers and commercial traders Cliff refers to in his post.
Update Sept 22:
ColdCore now reports at SeekingAlpha some details about those other sovereign nations and their interest in acquiring the "real money" that the west shuns.
Labels:
Commodities,
Currency,
Inflation,
Sound Money
Friday, September 11, 2009
Corporate Bonds Priced to Perfection
Just posting this to record the event for future reference. This example of today's bond market pricing is a set up that makes us uncomfortable about bond prices. They've rallied so much that spreads don't allow much in the way of price appreciation on Corporates unless Treasury rates across the curve all come down.
It would be an unusual situation indeed for the U.S. economy to recover and have Treasury yields drop from where they are now. Some examples of price movement lately:
------
Update 10/15/2009
J.D. Steinhilber, over at Seeking Alpha, provides some current bond information and more detail on the bond investor's dilemma.
It would be an unusual situation indeed for the U.S. economy to recover and have Treasury yields drop from where they are now. Some examples of price movement lately:
Colgate deal which priced several weeks ago at T+ 67. The deal was a six year maturity. That issue is now traded 14 basis points rich to the 7 year Treasury.Source: Across the Curve
Walmart 5 year paper issued in May at T+ 125 basis points. That paper trades 40 basis points over the 5 year Treasury.
MSFT 5 year paper is freely available at T+ 25
------
Update 10/15/2009
J.D. Steinhilber, over at Seeking Alpha, provides some current bond information and more detail on the bond investor's dilemma.
Labels:
Bonds,
Interest Rates
Carry Trade, Funded by the U.S.
There's an interesting piece out of Across the Curve today from a USD/JPY analysis. If it's a fluke of nature and prices revert to the recent normal relationships, it will be easier to predict the outcome of US fiscal policy. If this is the start of a protracted trend, the global dynamics of money flow will be very different.
Namely, all this excess liquidity piling up from US and global quantitative easing would not produce the normal expected price inflation in the U.S. if dollars are borrowed by the Carry Trade crowd to fund their currency speculations outside of U. S. borders.
Namely, all this excess liquidity piling up from US and global quantitative easing would not produce the normal expected price inflation in the U.S. if dollars are borrowed by the Carry Trade crowd to fund their currency speculations outside of U. S. borders.
3mth USD LIBOR is now LOWER 3mth JPY LIBOR. This spread turned negative about three weeks ago, and in the same timeframe, Usd/Jpy has also fallen 2.9% (see chart attached).We're not going to jump on a bandwagon touting that last sentence just yet, but if it comes to fruition it would sure change the dynamics of Bernanke's unwinding process. It might be the mechanism that gives the U.S. another stab at exporting the fiscal consequences of policies to the developing world. In other words, more of what has just happened in the last 10 years.
Bottom line, the USD is soon becoming the new global funding currency...
(Source: Across the Curve)
Labels:
Currency,
Interest Rates
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)