The Fed's Report Card, by The Fed

The federal reserve put out their assessment of Ben Bernanke's helicopter ride in a report titled Large-Scale Asset Purchases by the Federal Reserve: Did They Work?

Presumably it isn't surprising they conclude what one expects when demand rushes in like a flood:

We present evidence that the purchases led to economically meaningful and long-lasting reductions in longer-term interest rates on a range of securities, including securities that were not included in the purchase programs. These reductions in interest rates primarily reflect lower risk premiums, including term premiums, rather than lower expectations of future short-term interest rates.

Well of course! When demand for security jumps, so does the price. For a bond, rates fall when prices fall. And given the money to fund the purchase was created out of thin air, there was no decrease in demand for competitive instruments. The money that may have purchased those bonds was free to purchase others.

The reductions reflected lower risk premiums because it was made perfectly clear that there is no limit to the money available (since it doesn't come from finite pre-existing money) and hence no reason to expect lack of funding. It didn't reflect lower expectations of future short-term interest rates because it was also made clear it would end and the dilution effect was sure to increase the inflation premium in future markets.

One wonders if the authors actually expected any other conclusion. Imagine a rocket scientist being surprised that propelling an object at 200 MPH in an upward vector would make the object fly, but eventually fall to the earth as the applied acceleration source was stopped.

In spite of the humorous angle, it's a good piece of writing for one who wants to get a good look at how open market operations function.

Investing on The Edge of a Precipice

Today we highly recommend the March 8th weekly comment by John Hussman, The Rubber Hits the Road. Hussman makes some good points about history, comparing post-war economies with financial-crisis economies, relates that to this present period we face, and describes the human psychological factors that come to bear on security prices. The discussion of pending mortgage resets and how that may play out is particularly relevant.

It is interesting to see someone actually point out how and when we may rely on the irrational exuberance of speculators to make informed decisions of our own:

As we move through the coming months, resolving the "two data sets" issue will help us to determine which set of historical precedents is relevant. If the current economic environment produces fresh credit strains similar to previous periods of credit difficulty in the U.S., Japan and elsewhere, valuations and margin of safety will remain the most important consideration in determining investment positions. If the economic situation reveals itself to be more like typical post-war cycles, valuations will still be an important consideration, but we'll be better able to assume that speculation (provided sufficient evidence from market internals) will be reliable even in the absence of clear fundamental support from valuations.

If you are a Graham-Dodd fan, you'll particularly like how Hussman builds upon their foundation in presenting the expectations of investors in the current environment. Our conclusions is that with the infatuation Americans have with entertainment and personal emotions and opinions over facts and substance, we are unlikely to see any sound behavior by the general public with regard to investments.

The one thing he didn't mention in March 8th were the fundamental factors pointed out in a previous weekly comment, which contribute a third influence on the confluence of forces affecting the markets: the Fed quantitative easing policy coming coming to an end, just about the time we may begin to receive some clarity on his "two data sets". Add to that the potential for more debt issues out of Europe in the next few months, and the security markets may very well be resting on a weak precipice.

Now YOU Can Have Bank Reserves, Too.

"As an additional means of draining reserves, the Federal Reserve is also developing plans to offer to depository institutions term deposits, which are roughly analogous to certificates of deposit that the institutions offer to their customers."
(Source: Ben Bernanke's exit strategy testimony)

We have to hand it to this guy, he is one of the most creative bankers in history. In just two sigmas the American people can sink their claws into Federal Reserve excess reserves. Now all we need are 15 million savers willing to lock up their full FDIC insurance allocation in these new instruments, which will probably pay diddly-squat interest.

Of course money market accounts will have direct access, too, so the consumer angle is actually not that important, provided consumers feel compelled to put their money into money markets paying diddly-squat instead.

The real problem with bank reserves is that they don't provide a rate of return. The only way to entice the free market to park their money in reverse repos is to make them more attractive to alternative investments. So this plan can only work if interest rates rise (to attract capital into these instruments) or velocity of money remains low (velocity being the basis for high reserve balances as a threat). If velocity picks up, price inflation will also, and rates will naturally rise. The trillion dollar question is how quickly can rates stifle inflation forces, or will the lag between price increases and rate increases be a kind of self-accelerant of velocity. The feed-back loop could be phenomenal.

But that's all just speculation, isn't it? No doubt the creative genius of Bernanke will devise a plan for that at the right time. Of course Greenspan didn't stop the dot-com bubble, and Bernanke didn't stop the real estate bubble, so it's pretty hard to imagine what will provide Bernanke with the incredible insight and forethought to recognize how to prevent the next bubble. One thing is for sure, it ought to be interesting.

In July of last year we had similar comments on the exit strategy. One might want to compare notes, both ours and Ben's, to see how things have changed.

Sector Analysis and Business Cycles

Faheem Gill has a nice analysis of the business cycle and equity sectors that do well in each. He focuses on energy, but the charts would be good for one to copy and mark with one's own preferred investments at each stage.

The only thing lacking is a note to shift out of equities into bonds at the peak of the interest rate cycle.

Treasurys No Longer Risk Free

It looks like this generation may be the one to see a new definition for "risk free interest rate".

From Bloomberg yesterday:

The bond market is saying that it’s safer to lend to Warren Buffett than Barack Obama.

Two-year notes sold by the billionaire’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. in February yield 3.5 basis points less than Treasuries of similar maturity ... Procter & Gamble Co., Johnson & Johnson and Lowe’s Cos. debt also traded at lower yields in recent weeks, a situation former Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. chief fixed-income strategist Jack Malvey calls an “exceedingly rare” event in the history of the bond market.

Wikipedia also has a good article on the importance of this to investment models.

Metals and Mining

Today we discovered Wildebeests, a web site devoted (in their own words) to the four M's: Minerals, Metals, the 'Merican economy, and Mathematica. They have some very good research and writing skills on the subject matter dear to our hearts, hard assets, and as such have earned a place in our investor links.

For some dialog between us, see the topic "Investing in Copper — What You Need to Know"

How Can Stock Market Asset Prices Fall?

For the stock market to drop in value, something else has to be in greater demand. In the realm of paper assets, the only competition for equity is debt or debt-money, and the non-paper competition is commodities and real-estate. Let's look at each one, except real-estate, which should be clear without saying in the spring of 2010 is a non-starter.

It's been clear for about three years now that money does not flee to hard assets when paper assets are in jeopardy. Those hard assets experience a sell off, too, as money flees in a crisis for the stability of U.S. dollars. This should be expected for some of the reasons we pointed out in November. So if the stock market has a significant sell off, don’t expect a commodity price spike. Whether one thinks it should or shouldn't is irrelevant. That fact is it hasn't done so for the last three years. If you think it should, then take the sell-off as a chance to take a position at steep discounts. We address the fallacy of the counter-argument for deflation at the end.

We are then left with the realm of paper-assets: debt-money (currency) or debt instruments. Debt instruments can get very complicated because there are many types with a variety of risk and valuation models. However, we can simplify that into a few commonalities: short term and long term, corporate and government. There is another debt instrument that doesn't quite fit that simplification: debt derivatives. Of the collateralized debt types, they essential represent the same fundamentals as bonds, except risks are slightly lower as default risk is diversified among autonomous entities. The other common derivatives can be grouped as options, futures, or credit default swaps. Virtually all of those by definition are relativity short-term bets.

If one is worried about equity valuations (the theme of this writing) corporate bonds would be of interest to some as bonds receive the first-fruits of cash flows and stand ahead of stock in bankruptcy (government usurpation notwithstanding). But if equity prices are at risk, corporate default risks rise, too, so prudent investors won't flee to corporate bonds in a crisis. We find ourselves left with short and long government debt, or debt derivatives, competing with equity for capital investment.

Let's take debt derivatives now, particularly the CDS type. The only intelligent reason to sell equity for CDS is a credit crisis. This is in fact exactly what we saw in February. As the credit crisis that precipitated the change subsides, money flows back out of short term CDS instruments and back into longer term assets. While we don't have access to CDS price charts, we can certainly see the equity markets didn't stay low for long, which is consistent in fact and in theory with crisis of the past. So CDS competition is necessarily sudden or short lived, especially as CDS contracts are temporal by nature.

The next type of debt instruments we look at are short term parking places: short-term government bonds, and short-term derivatives other than CDS. All are havens for capital in times of uncertainly. All are temporary parking places where one then reallocates into something of greater risk with more reward potential as the precipitating event subsides. The certainty of that movement is assured by monetary low-interest rate policies of central banks. No serious money manager can sit on ROI assets below 2% for long unless in fact the world experiences price deflation of all asset classes across the board. The Austrian theory of inflation arising as a consequence of money creation suggests in this season of 2010 that is an absurd expectation. The arguments to the contrary are addressed below.

Like real-estate, it should go without saying that holding long term government bonds in an era of Keynesian expansion with extremely low interest rates as one of the most high risk (to asset price) low-yield investments of capital. Just as rolling short term bond holdings into short term bond holdings for an extended period is only sensible in an era of broad-based systemic price deflation, holding fixed rate long bonds when currencies are threatened by increasing debt, and interest rates have no where to go but up, is asking for capital loss.

Finally, the last paper asset vying for attention of investor and speculator capital is currency. In a crisis, even after all the liquidity measures and deficit spending in the U.S., the U.S. dollar is still the target of those fleeing for safety. Again, we aren't concerned about whether that is a long term good bet, but simply recognize it as the status quo. If indeed one believes such moves are unwise in the long run, take it as an opportunity to buy more reliable dollar based assets at a discount if it should transpire. But keep in mind, when this flight to safety takes place, money that isn't secured in currency derivatives will be parked in government bonds of the currency of choice, and we’ve demonstrated those arguments only have temporary extremely short value propositions. So the fundamentals of holding "cash" (pseudonym for currency), is really just another name for a bond position, and hence currency moves will follow the fundamentals of bond investments. Since bonds of all substantive nations are basically in the same boat, we don’t expect significant changes in currency price ratios as much as we’ll see in equity positions, and of course foreigners’ demands for equities ultimately translates into foreigners’ bias for currency price ratios. We covered that topic to some degree in our September piece titled "Where is the Next Bubble?"

Given the choices money managers have in allocating capital, there appears to be only one reason to expect any kind of significant decline in equity prices in the near term, and that's a flight to safety. Just as the financial crisis of the past faded into history, there's every reason to believe this one will play out the same. We pointed out some of those reasons in November under the title "Contagion: Been There, Done That"

In that piece we also point out how the latter sub-crisis had less effect than the instigating crisis. We've seen this take place recently with Greece's crisis, where there was some quick and noticeable reaction to flee to dollars and push down equities and commodities, but it was short lived and of little significance. Many have tried to build the case that "this time it's different" and pull some data out of a hat that appears different. Typically what we find is that they simply were unaware of similar data that did appear last time, or they miss the similarity of essence and difference only in nomenclature of the old and new data.

So we are left with the only variable that could explain a protracted equity bear market - positive or negative inflation. Positive inflation usually gets improperly discounted by the established world view in one of two ways -- they pick a measure of money that hasn't grown well and then conclude we'll see tame inflation or deflation, or they pick a secondary influencing factor (velocity is popular these days) and argue that it will overcome the creation of money. We've provided some links on the velocity argument back in July '09 and revealed how money supply and velocity can take some interesting forms. It is our belief that the contradictions between the Austrian school theory that inflation is a monetary phenomena, and the new school that it is a velocity issue, is simply missing the point that the Austrian school theory carries with it an inferred premise that the time between the money hitting the street and the prices showing up at retail are delayed by several months to a few years. In order for monetary inflation to not eventually show up in price inflation (either consumer or capital asset price increases), one has to permanently and systemically keep the velocity low. For nations whose people have consumer goods in abundance, inflation most likely appears in financial asset prices. For nations whose people have a higher portion of earnings going toward basic goods and services, inflation most likely appears in consumer goods.

One could achieve low monetary velocity with an economic collapse, but no substantial and influential market participant in the global economy is working toward that goal. Every policy choice and operation is designed to get people to dump their cash for something that will provide a return. All policies are designed (intentionally or accidentally) to make holding cash a losing proposition. It's the essence of both kinds of capitalism; traditional theoretical capitalism and corrupted modern capitalism. The former objective is to use one's financial capital to produce value in goods and services to reap a return on investment. The latter objective is to use one's financial capital to make other people's money work for you. The latter is the fundamental basis of the debt-money system used by every nation on earth: leverage. With every segment of every population save a few fringe radical thinkers working toward the same objective (i.e. maximum return on investment) something global and earth shaking will have to occur to put everyone off their agenda. We aren't suggesting that can't happen, just that the most likely expectation is that it won't happen until this next round of business cycle expansion pops sometime in the teens of the 21st century.

For the stock market to drop in value, something else has to be in greater demand. At this juncture in 2010 it goes without saying that real-estate and long bonds are non-starters. Other hard assets have proven themselves unattractive as replacements (albeit good co-equals) for equities. Being left with nothing other than short-term non-performing parking places and short term quick gains made attractive by temporary sudden shocks, there simply isn’t any real long-term asset class competition to distract the global investment community from demanding more equity positions. The prudent scholar, historian, and investor should be prepared for another cyclical equity bull market in the coming few years.

Insider's view of the business cycle

What does the business cycle look like after a bust when you're the one on the inside looking out at the investment horizon? According to Bloomberg, it looks like half a trillion dollars.

"Buyout funds sitting on half a trillion dollars committed by investors may need more than a decade to put the money to work if mergers and acquisitions continue at the current pace."
(source: Bloomberg)

As readers should be well aware, nothing stays the same. The rate of M&A spending of the last year or so won't be the rate of spending in the future. As the business recovery solidifies the evidence of a "good buy" will change for the better and this money will start flowing. But notice this key point from the same article:

"“Investors only give the fund a particular investment period, typically three to six years, to invest the capital,” said Michael Harrell, co-chair of Debevoise & Plimpton LLC’s private-equity funds group in New York. “If you don’t use it, you lose it.”"

So there are two strong human factors at play there. First, those entrusted with the money don't want their clients to take it back. They will find a way to put that to work, and they have only two or three years to do so. What a coincidence this lull in M&A just happens to coincide with the first signs of recovery. (NOT!)

Second, if they don't put that capital to work, the clients who take the money back are going to have a lot of pent up demand as they seek out someone who will put the money to work for them.

No matter how you slice it, the business cycle is alive and well with capital left over from the recession looking for something to buy. 'Buy' is the operative word there. The only unanswered question is what will be in demand, and you can be sure it won't be cash and cash equivalents. After all, we're not talking about a world of Warren Buffett money managers. These are sharks looking for a kill.

But lest one gets too excited, temper the emotions with an interesting chart from the Bespoke Group. Looking at that 2009 March low, which was the bottom of that bust of the last business cycle, one should expect the 68% number will stick. Not only is the potential from here much less than the potential from 'there', but we still have a wave of news about to arrive regarding the mortgage reset wave of 2010.

We don't personally expect the news to crash the market or the economy, and don't expect a double-dip recession, but we do expect a wobbly stock market too jittery to make a firm run in either direction, albeit with a bias trend upward as happens with any business cycle boom phase.

As an aside, the astute reader should be careful to differentiate a boom from a bubble. Bubble talk won't be appropriate until about two or three years from now.

American Justice on Trial

Uggh, this is certainly off topic, but the significance of the mockery of the American Justice system is too important to ignore. We won't comment any more on this, but readers should take the full 10 minutes to watch this whole video.

The first eight minutes are the setup that describes why Americans should cherish their legal system, built upon the foundation that the accused is guilty until proven innocent.

...if that man is tried in an American court under the American system of justice, then there can only be one verdict rendered, and that verdict is, not guilty“
- William Whittle

Don't miss the legal basis for that conclusion.

First Sign of Reserve Improvements

Great news. Bank reserves have shown the first sign of change for the better.

For January, non-borrowed reserves have finally revealed a down tick. Sure, it's no big change, but it is the first sign. They've been steadily rising as the fed "adds reserves" (aka prints money) to buy agency debt. Note that this down-tick occurred in January while the fed was still adding reserves. That means banks are starting to lend again.

It's no surprise then that the TAF and discount rates were revised this week back toward pre-crisis conditions. No doubt the fed has better data than this nearly month-old update.

Get Paid To Move Your Positions

Normally if you want to transfer your securities from one account to another you have to pay a broker to do that for you. This is certainly a preferred method in taxable accounts, since selling in one and buying in another would trigger a tax consequence and possibly incur significant costs from commissions if you have a lot of positions to move. If your securities are in a tax sheltered account though, you can use options to move those securities and generate income rather than an expense.

Options sell at a premium. If the underlying price is $70.00 and you buy a put option with a strike price of $75, you can expect to pay more than $5.00 for the privileged of selling the position at a higher price than it is at the moment. You can use that to your advantage in this position moving scenario by selling the option in the account where you want the position to be at the same time you sell the underlying in the account you no longer want it.

Here's the dollars and cents of it:

Account A:
Sell 1000 XYZ for $70.00.
Income: $70,000

Account B:
Sell 10 XYZ front month in the money $75 puts for $5.30
Income: $5,300

At Expiration:
Assign $75 put.
Expense: $75,000

Net: $70,000 + $5,300 - $75,000 = $300.

Assuming you aren't doing business with Lame Broker's LLC, the $300 net gain should be well above the cost of commissions.

The key point is you need to make this move when the markets are stable and reasonably predictable so the underlying doesn't shoot up so much in price that your option does not get assigned (unless it is also desired that you be out of the position at the strike price anyway). The days immediately after earnings is a good time to do this as you will get a good idea of price direction, and most market moving surprises about the fundamentals of a company come out at that time.

The Fed Did Not Raise Rates

Did the Federal Reserve just come out and surprise the world with a "rate hike"? Technically, yes. It all depends on what "is" is. Read the official press release.

Notice this isn't really changing the fundamentals. What really happened was they removed some of the recent "emergency" measures.

On August 17, 2007, the Federal Reserve reduced the spread of the primary credit rate over the FOMC's target for the federal funds rate to 1/2 percentage point, from 1 percentage point, and lengthened the typical maximum maturity from overnight to 30 days.

As we pointed out in "Credit Spreads Expected to Narrow", the business cycle is alive and well. The Federal Reserve basically just sent out a press release to that effect. They've restored the spread and duration to pre-crash conditions. Yea, the spread is still not quite there, but hopefully you get the picture.

This is a change at the discount window and TAF, not fed funds. Bernanke is pushing up that rate to force banks to suck up the fed funds and entice other bond holders to find repurchase funding in the commercial paper markets. We predict it won’t have any impact on lending costs just as they say (since fed funds are still over-supplied), but to the extent the public believes this is something big, there’s some good shorting opportunities for the next day or two.

This is more to do with normalizing the old methodologies than a real rate policy change. The daily Fed Funds market shows no signs whatsoever of "improving conditions" as far as market interest rates in ring-zero financing is concerned.

All through the policy changes leading up to market collapse the Fed Funds data revealed policy changes in the days leading up the public announcements. Expect to see something move there, too, before any real rate increases happens in monetary policy. As it stands the current news is just getting a few markets back to pre-crash normality.

Credit Spreads Expected to Narrow

This Time Is Not Different

The business cycle is alive and well. If you read the blogs and mainstream media you'll see a lot of bearish sentiment about the destruction of the American economy. Certain things won't be exactly like they were, but the interesting thing we see often is those bearish pessimists keep trying to discredit the optimists by pointing out the fallacy of "this time it's different", meaning this bubble isn't going to thrive any more than the last one.

Well, they're right on one count. The bubble won't thrive better than the last. But the one guilty of clinging to a fallacy are the bears. The "this time it's different" fallacy really points back at them. See, the bears are trying to sell us on the idea that "this time" the business cycle isn't going to happen. No sir, this time we've really shot ourselves and the stock market is just going to go right back down until the entire economic system of the world resets.

Well, maybe we exaggerate their point of view a little, but the essence is there. We contend the business cycle is alive and well and the prudent person will plan accordingly.

So how then do we interpret the budget deficits in light of the business cycle? For background on the business cycle of boom and bust one should go dig around at some of our favorite economic sites:

The Mises Institute
The Foundation for Economic Education
Cafe Hayek

Budget Deficits For Fun and Profit

Budget deficits necessitate a rise in interest rates. To attract money to Treasuries, the price has to fall since people will be competing for better returns in riskier assets. A lower price for Treasuries will attract that money to that instrument along some continuum of risk/reward which differs from one person to another. Meanwhile, the supply of Treasuries is going to be growing. To attract buyers then, the market has to push down the price of Treasuries.

On the off chance (slim as it is) that the government can’t attract buyers from the open market, the central bank will have to monetize the debt to prevent failed auctions. Hence, gold would be a good buy against U.S. dollar dilution by the central bank. This is not only true because of the recent past liquidity measures, but even more so for potential future liquidity efforts, if they arise.

Nevertheless, even if there are no more waves of quantitative easing, the last stimulus will be enough to create a wave of price inflation in the next five years. The recent sell-off in gold was simply profit taking and flight to cash on fears of Euro defaults, accentuated by program trading on the momentum and short term hysteria. Now that has subsided, we can get a wave of movement back toward long-term fundamental expectations based on centuries-old historical expectations of the boom-bust business cycle.

The beauty of this setup is that it implies higher risk in Treasuries than historical norms. Higher risk between Treasuries and corporate bonds means the spread between Treasury and corporate will narrow to the extent that businesses still know how to run a sound business. This translates to basic business-cycle fundamentals acting in opposite directions on the two sides of the spread.

Even though Keynes may not have had the big picture well understood when it comes to long term health of the economy, he was not wrong that government deficit spending stimulates demand for goods and services in the marketplace. Demand for goods and services in the marketplace is good for “business”, which translates into improving business credit default risk as cash flows improve for them.

Given then improving business credit default risks with degrading government credit default risk, we have a nice scenario that translates into narrowing credit spreads between so called "risk free" Treasuries and business risk corporates.

We're not trying to sell the value of the business cycle, or suggest it's a good thing. We simply want to point out it is alive and well. The fundamental factors that create it in the first place aren't gone. Names change and leaders switch places, but the same system that brought us all the other booms and bubbles is going to give you another one. We happen to think the global Q/E policies of every modern nation on the planet is going to make this next one a doozie. The good news is you have plenty of time to prepare for the pop and chaos that ensues from the bust.

For a more entertaining perspective, check out the viral video "Fear the Boom and Bust".

Can demand for credit derivatives really lead to economic decline?

If we read the attempted implications of "Bond Market Vigilantes Sink Stocks" right, Mr. Mirhaydari claims the surge in the CDS market is threatening to raise interest rates on sovereign debt, which will force governments to cut spending and raise taxes to counter the cost of debt, which leads to a double dip recession, which leads to a falling stock market.

It makes perfect sense except for the part about politicians giving any hoot at all about the cost of their debt. Europe certainly has rules about limited deficit spending, but does anyone else that matters to global growth have such constraints?

Still, if the rush for CDS instruments is really the impetus behind recent market movements, that money flow will eventually unwind as the speculators take their profits and look for another ride to get excited about. Maybe the only real connection that makes sense is that institutions that have the clout to speculate with CDS, bonds, equities, and commodities all over the world have found a nice little emotional roller coaster to take out for a spin, after which they’ll whipsaw the markets and ride something else up to hysterical levels when they are ready to take profit out of the CDS markets.

If Mirhaydari is correct we'll see people talking about S&P 500 at 600 within a few months. If our secondary supposition is correct, we should see a strong rebound in stocks and commodities before summer. According to Jim Jubak's analysis of leading and lagging indicators, the latter appears more plausible.

SPX Created Five Gaps Since 11/6 - The Chaos Indicator.

Count the gap-open on the S&P500 recently since November 6th. Notice how the chart (OHLC bar style) looks like a very unstable thinly-traded security. We count five gap-opens since the close on November 6th. If we fill that gap (which hasn't happened yet) it would put the SPX very close to the lower bound of the Bollinger-band.

Is there a technical formula that measures "chaos"? That's what the chart looks like since early November. If the chaos factor were high, would it be a bearish or bullish indicator? Intuition suggests bearish since it indicates indecisiveness, and selling and holding cash when you aren't sure what to do is easier than buying and holding risk when you have no firm conviction.

The Fear Factor

The following isn't technically a technical indicator discussion, but looking at the pattern of the current five month bull market from Bespoke Investment Group, we get the sense that both bulls and bears fear factor of being wrong and missing out on the big move is getting stronger.

We couldn't help but notice the length of the candles getting longer and more regular. Notice especially the first test of 1100 and the ensuing test of the 50 day SMA.

The run-ups are for the most part slow and steady (until the most recent one) and the pullbacks fast and furious. But notice the pullbacks almost always have strong up days trying to fight them.

Conclusion 1: the old adage that it's easier for the market to fall than rise is clearly seen. This is because pulling money out is easier than taking the risk of committing money and having it decline. Cash never declines in value (please, don't even think of starting a tangential diatribe about the dollar. We're talking about a two variable, and only two variable, equation: dollar priced SPX vs dollars, period.)

Conclusion 2: The 50-day and 1100 support and resistance points have become "sticky", both of them. In the last three areas where the price has approached either point the market did not want to move away from that point in either direction. There is very strong sentiment in both directions.

Monday will be interesting. We're expecting some volatile sideways movement as the moving average rises to the 1100 mark. Besides the technical aspects of that, the price range of indecision during the last three tests is awfully close to the range of price between support and resistance.

The ideal scenario would be sideways motion from now to end of year with SMA(50) rising up to 1100 without a strong breakout. That would give us some very nice income on our bi-directional short put strategy and top off our year with close to 20% gain so we can go flat around the new year and catch our breath, waiting out the market's indecisiveness and getting some sense of economic effects on corporate America during January earnings season.

While we're not one of those who subscribe to belief in the end of the financial world as we know it, the 10-year chart on SPX suggests this push off the bottom has come faster, straighter, and longer than the 2003 recovery. It is also clear the sell off was equally more straight. So one would expect a fast straight reversion to some equilibrium point. Because of that, our sentiment for the next few months is sideways/down for a few months as opposed to our current sideways/up sentiment. However, during 2006 we were bearish on the premise that the market can't just go straight up for a year without any correction, and was clearly proven wrong. We'll never say never again. [roll theme song]

My name's Bond ... Jade Bond.

Profit Taking Rules the Day

It appears the last two days saw big moves upward in all of the following:

10 and 30 year U.S. Treasurys
GLD
DBB
FXE
SPY
DIA
QQQQ

Stocks, bonds, commodities, everything on a roll at the same time. This can't be a sentiment shift (since Treasurys typically move the inverse of equities.) Our guess is derivative profit taking is pushing up underlying securities.

Where did all this money come from?

Has anyone else been watching this and have a specific explanation other than "the banks aren't lending". Seriously, where did 400 billion dollars come from in the last two months?

Non-borrowed reserves in the last two months have jumped from around 400 billion to around 800 billion.

Who's pumping money into the banking system?

Oh, and did you notice the shaded recession period is in the past. Somehow we missed that announcement, but we did observe something similar on November 10th.

Contagion: Been There, Done That

If you haven't seen Commanding Heights, we highly recommend it. It goes best with a strong thinking cap so you can read between the lines and find the subtle nuances of cause and effect in global finance.

I part three in particular, they covered the Asian Financial Crisis that started from a small little economy, that through currency controls created the exact same financial situation we had last year (don't miss the entire city built from the ground up on debt financing to which no one ever moved in to populate!), and as the piper came calling and financiers decided they were no longer going to sing that tune, it spread to all the healthy nations in the region as electronic funds transfers sucked all the money out of the region, one nation after another.

The funny thing is, that time the money needed a place to park, so it fled to another emerging nation -- Russia. They didn't go into details on the underlying reasons for Russia's default on debt, but ultimately it lead to Long Term Capital's implosion.

And then Brazil was hard on its heals with another collapse in this game of financial dominoes, but was averted by a quick influx of bail out money as the signs of stress were about to crack.

In every case: bail out after bail out after bail out.

The difference in 2008 was apparently "they" (those with all the money under control) learned how not to make the same mistake. When credit stopped in 2008, the money this time went straight to U.S. Dollars. No messing around this time with some new emerging entity that offered hope and promise of the perfect utopia. Instead, get out, park the money in the one nation and one security most likely to not have a political revolution over the hub-bub, and wait it out.

So in spite of all the uproar over Federal Reserve emergency lending and government bail out of banks in 2008, it really was not unprecedented. It was exactly what was done the last time. The only difference being this time it was an internal massive bailout instead of foreign nation massive bailouts. We contend the labels on the entities in question are irrelevant. It's the same thing every time (remember the third-world financial bail outs in the 80s?) Apparently it's a necessary evil every decade.

There is nothing new under the sun. Watch it, learn to read the signs, and get ready for a repeat since the fundamental foundations, the global monetary systems, haven't changed one bit. The hard part is learning how to discount and ignore the incessant monthly claims that "it's going to happen again!! Sell now and protect yourself!!!"

Meanwhile, like last time, it appears the contagion has stopped spreading. See our other post today, The Financial Crisis of 2008 is Officially Over.

We left out one interesting link on those references though. Just as Brazil's contagion was contained by preemptive quick response, The Fed has preempted the Commercial Real Estate issues that are falling on the heals of this most recent global financial crisis. Like Brazil's non-issue of the 90s, we predict the present CRE "crisis" will also become a little known financial issue of 2010.

In a nutshell, banks can restructure the loans and won't be "criticized" for what otherwise would have been bad lending practices. It's now OK to carry bad debt on the books.

Just like Japan? Well, not exactly. Turns out we can learn another important fact from Commanding Heights. In the 90s, when Japan's banks were stuck with all those bad loans, one bold man stood up and suggested if they want to get out of the crisis they need to loosen up the over-bearing burdensome regulatory structure that was constraining the banks. He was quickly fired from his cabinet post, they refused to "fix" the systemic problem, and the lost decade ensued.

If Benny and Timmy had nationalized the banks in the U.S. to "solve" our crisis and put massive layers of regulation on them (as if you can implement "Soviet Union Economics" and create vital capital formation) then we would have been destined for a lost decade in the U.S. as well. Instead, we have a much better chance of getting back to normal, which is setting ourselves up for another crisis in the teens of the 21st century just like the previous three decades.

The Financial Crisis of 2008 is Officially Over

On Friday of last week:

The Federal Reserve Board announced Friday that a temporary exemption to the limitations in section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, instituted as part of the response to the financial crisis, will expire as scheduled on October 30, 2009
(source: 2009 Banking and Consumer Regulatory Policy)

Then today:

9 of the 10 Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) that were determined in the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) earlier this year to need to raise capital or improve the quality of their capital to withstand a worse-than-expected economic scenario now have increased their capital sufficiently to meet or exceed their required capital buffers. The one exception, GMAC, is expected to meet its remaining buffer need by accessing the TARP Automotive Industry Financing Program, and is in discussions with the U.S. Treasury on the structure of its investment
(source: 2009 Banking and Consumer Regulatory Policy)

Update 11/18/2009

In light of the continued improvement in financial market conditions, the Federal Reserve Board on Tuesday announced that it approved a reduction in the maximum maturity of primary credit loans...
Prior to August 2007, the maximum available term of primary credit was generally overnight. The Federal Reserve lengthened the maximum maturity first to 30 days on August 17, 2007 and then to 90 days on March 16, 2008...
(source: Federal Reserve Press Release)